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The Deep Structure of Taxation:
Dividend Distributions
Charles I. Kingson*
It's something like calculus. If you know why one thing
is happening, you can figure out the other things.
Calvin Hill, on understanding football.'
I. Introduction
A. Basic Tax Concepts
This article tries to develop a logical and consistent definition of
one of the basic concepts of the Internal Revenue Code2-that of
dividend distributions. Tax analysis begins with basic concepts, which
are embodied in words like dividend, sale, lease, debt, and stock; to
use these words is to define them. One cannot, for example, decide
that property has been sold rather than leased without somehow say-
ing what "sale" and "lease" mean.
Contrary to the tone of most criticism,3 which focuses on statutory
complexity, this article illustrates that difficulty in understanding
tax law most frequently arises from failure by those who use basic
concepts to grasp their meaning, rather than from any excessive at-
tempt at statutory precision. Accordingly, the idea that such law can
be made more understandable or accessible by simplifying the lan-
'Member, New York Bar. The author wishes to thank Jeffrey A. Schoenblum and
John D. Fitzsimmons for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. Wind, The Sporting Scene, NEw YORKER, Dec. 16, 1974, at 122, 147.
2. Current provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will be cited by section
number only.
3. See, e.g., Roberts, Friedman, Ginsberg et al., A Report on Complexity and the
Income Tax, 27 TAx L. REv. 325 (1972) (New York State Bar Association, Tax Section,
Committee on Tax Policy) [hereinafter cited as Report on Complexity].
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guage of the Code does not respond to this essential difficulty and
challenge of tax practice. 4
A practitioner is not expected to understand, much less be an ex-
pert on, the entire Code, which purports to govern all economic ac-
tivity. Perhaps fewer than 200 people in the country could work
with the recently repealed minimum distribution rule, with its 50
pages of regulations in small type. But those who needed to, did;
and the detail of the regulations achieved a high degree of pre-
dictability. By contrast, every practitioner should understand con-
cepts so elemental that the Code does not, and probably should not,
even articulate them. But too often courts have used these concepts
without understanding the definitions they were creating or even
that they were creating definitions. Moreover, since the same word
has been given meaning in several contexts, inconsistent or contra-
dictory definitions are more easily overlooked. Perhaps the best evi-
dence of the importance, significance, and difficulty of the subject
is the large proportion of Supreme Court tax cases that have had
to determine the meaning of everyday words: interest, 6 dividend, 7
sale,8 gift,9 trade or business, 0 loss and bad debt," debt and stock,' -
primarily,' 3 solely,14 and property."a
4. The growth of the Code has resulted to some extent from the inability of reason-
ably short statutory language to resolve problems not perceived at the time of enactment.
An illustration is the intended statutory overruling, by the present § 368(a)(2)(C) and the
last clause of § 368(a)(1)(C), of the results of Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82 (1937),
Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1938), and United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564
(1938). Other factors contributing to the Code's length include the following: provisions
of limited application, variously called incentives and preferences, e.g., §§ 167(k), 921;
the necessity to limit strictly to its intended beneficiaries relief from a rule of general
application, as in § 341(e); a desire for extensive regulation, as in the case of private
foundations and pension plans, e.g., §§ 401-415, 441-47; and finally, provisions for
combatting the ingenuity of tax avoidance, as in §§ 304 and 306.
5. The Report on Complexity's criticism of the time and expense needed to under-
stand such detail, based on the inability of the small businessman to afford expertise, is
to some extent disingenuous. Report on Complexity, supra note 3, at 327. For example,
provisions such as subpart F of the Code (§§ 951-964), of which the minimum distribu-
tion rule was a part, were enacted to prevent highly sophisticated methods of inter-
national tax deferral. For a businessman who does not wish to try siphoning off profit
from high tax countries by the use of sales and service companies or repatriating profits
to the United States without paying a dividend tax, subpart F should present no problem.
6. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
7. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
8. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
9. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
10. Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974); Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S.
193 (1963); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
11. Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
12. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
13. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
14. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
15. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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A Supreme Court decision cannot impose a completely uniform
definition of a concept. In fact, many of its tax decisions raise ques-
tions about definitions generally accepted by the tax bar.'6 But a
disturbing tendency has arisen recently-expressed by the Supreme
Court in Snow v. Commissioner,17 and by two well-respected judges,
Henry Friendly and Theodore Tannenwald-to reject the idea that
consistency of tax meaning is a realistic possibility.'" Judge Friendly,
for example, concluded that "where the Internal Revenue Code is
concerned, no controlling weight can be given to the usual presump-
tion that, when the same words are used in several sections of a
statute, they mean the same thing."' 9
In a philosophical sense, meaning itself may be necessarily tentative
and imprecise. However, as a matter of tax law the same word can
and should refer to business transactions whose structural similarity
can be articulated with reasonable precision. More specifically, it is
submitted that a logical and consistent meaning of the term "dividend"
can explain two lines of cases in which substantial definitional issues
exist despite more than 60 years of income taxation. Those cases in-
volve (a) distributions by a corporation incident to a sale or exchange
of its stock, and (b) transfers of property between commonly-controlled
companies. In order to analyze the cases, however, it is first necessary
to understand what a dividend is and what it is not.
2 0
B. Dividends, Form and Substance: Telling
the Dancer from the Dance
A dividend does not confer an economic benefit on its recipient.
The distribution leaves the shareholder no richer, since his directly-
owned assets increase only by the same amount that the beneficial
ownership of those assets represented by his stock interest diminishes.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 404 U.S. 937 (1972) (definition of "possession or
enjoyment" for estate tax purposes).
17. 416 U.S. 500, 502-03 (1974).
18. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1220, 1222-23 (2d Cir. 1975); Tele-
phone Answering Serv. Co., 63 T.C. 423, 434-35 (1975). Compare these cases with Judge
Friendly's more synthetic approach in Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 130-31 (2d
Cir. 1962).
19. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1220, 1223 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. Section 316(a) defines a dividend as a distribution of property by a corporation to
its shareholders out of post-1913 or current earnings and profits. Sections 61(a)(7) and
301(c)(1) include a dividend in a recipient's gross income. This article focuses on the
relation between the concept of dividend and the occurrence of a distribution of
property; it is not primarily concerned with other issues involved in the taxation of
dividends, such as whether earnings and profits are sufficient to cover all distributions,
or whether the distribution results in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's pro-
portionate interest and is therefore a redemption not essentially equivalent to a dividend
(§ 302(b)).
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A dividend therefore is included in gross income not because it af-
fects the shareholder's net worth (which is increased even by undis-
tributed corporate profits), but because the distributed property no
longer is in corporate solution.
It can be argued that obtaining control over the distributed proper-
ty-being able to use or dispose of it as the shareholder wants-benefits
the shareholder in a tangible way. The corollary, however, must be
that the original conversion of money from personal to investment
use through the purchase of stock worsened his economic position.
In fact, an investor trades control and possession of his funds for the
possibility of greater profit. Savings banks, for example, generally
offer the highest interest to depositors who give up their withdrawal
rights for the longest period. The recipient of a dividend regains con-
trol and possession over part of his investment but giyes up the rate
of return the corporation could have earned on that money.
An indication that investors might consider reinvestment of cor-
porate profits of greater benefit to them than receipt of cash dividends
is the existence of automatic dividend reinvestment plans offered by
many New York Stock Exchange companies. Such plans offer share-
holders the opportunity to reinvest dividends with the corporation
rather than to receive the cash, and many shareholders accept the
offer even though the reinvested amount will be included in their
taxable income.21
The confusion of dividends with economic benefit may result in
part from the market behavior of widely-owned stocks, 22 although
the tax cases usually concern companies with few shareholders. For
the latter type of company, the distinction between corporate and
shareholder control over funds narrows and may vanish. One indi-
cation that shareholders of closely-held 23 corporations in particular
do not regard the purported economic benefit of a dividend as worth
its tax cost is the Internal Revenue Code itself. In order to force
shareholders of such corporations to confer the purported benefit
21. See § 305(b)(1).
22. The price of publicly traded shares often rises upon anticipation or declaration
of an increased dividend and declines when an anticipated dividend is reduced or
omitted. There is no logical reason, however, for an investor to pay a higher price for
the shares simply for the opportunity to obtain cash, since he could achieve the same
result by waiting until the dividend was distributed and then paying less for the shares.
This market behavior is more likely a reaction to what the dividend indicates about
the company's prospects.
23. The term closely-held corporation, in this context, includes a subsidiary of a
publicly-held corporation, since the parent generally has effective control over the sub-
sidiary's assets.
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upon themselves, §§ 531 and 541 of the Code impose substantial
penalty taxes for not doing so.2 4
The reluctance of such companies to declare dividends reflects a
correct perception that a dividend is fundamentally a taxable rather
than an economic occasion. A shareholder in, say, the 40% bracket is
better off causing his corporation to invest a dollar in respect of his
stock interest than receiving the dollar himself and investing the 60
cents remaining after tax. For tax purposes, therefore, a dividend dis-
tribution should be regarded simply as an occasion for imposing tax.
A dividend is nothing more or less than a taxable event, which indi-
vidual shareholders usually seek to avoid and corporate shareholders
may seek to incur in preference to capital gain.2 5
Nevertheless, in both lines of cases discussed in this article-one
involving distributions incident to a sale or exchange; the other, trans-
fers between commonly-controlled companies-courts discuss whether
or to whom a dividend distribution has been made in terms of eco-
nomic benefits received and the underlying substance of the trans-
action. This attempt to attribute economic substance to what is only
a change in the form of asset ownership must end in confusion and
futility, as illustrated by an archetypal decision of each line of cases
-Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner26 and PPG Industries,
Inc.2 7 In both instances courts sought to determine the existence of
a dividend not just with reference to whether property had been
transferred out of corporate solution, but also with reference to tax
avoidance, which necessarily assumes the existence of an underlying
economic substance. But whereas Waterman Steamship held that a
dividend had not occurred because the purported recipient had a
tax avoidance motive, PPG held that a dividend had not occurred
because the purported recipient did not have a tax avoidance motive.
The fallacy is their common assumption that economic substance can
be found in a transaction whose essence is form.
Part II of the article begins with a detailed analysis of Waterman,
whose grafting of tax avoidance motive onto the concept of dividend
fails to persuade for at least two reasons: first, what it considers tax
24. Although § 531 literally applies both to publicly and closely-held companies, it
has been held inapplicable to the former. Golconda Mining Corp., 507 F.2d 594 (9th Cir.
1974), rev'g and remanding 58 T.C. 139 and 58 T.C. 736 (1972). The Internal Revenue
Service will not follow that case. Rev. Rul. 75-305, 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 12.
25. Corporations generally prefer to receive dividend rather than capital gain income,
because § 243 or the consolidated return provisions of § 1502 allow them to deduct from
income a minimum of 85%, and a maximum of 100%, of dividends received from a
domestic corporation.
26. 50 T.C. 650 (1968), rev'd, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970). See pp. 867-73 infra.
27. 55 T.C. 928 (1970). See pp. 899-905 infra.
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avoidance is now required by Treasury regulations; second, the tax
result it proscribes could have been achieved by other means. It is
therefore difficult to discover what economic substance the taxpayer
in Waterman was trying to avoid; and the question then becomes why
the decision associates substance with dividend distributions at all.
The explanation of Waterman's attempt to graft some notion of
economic substance onto the definition of dividend distributions is
set forth in sections B and C of Part II, which focus on the cases lead-
ing up to Waterman. Although the results of those cases were con-
sistent with the form used by the taxpayer, their reasoning spoke of
substance. Search for the substance of dividends has prevented courts
from recognizing that, where the form of a negotiated distribution
incident to a stock sale is not respected by a court, what justifies
that disregard is the substance of negotiations, not any purported sub-
stance of diviends. The tax substance of negotiations is prescribed
by the Supreme Court case of Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner;28
and, as discussed below in section D of Part II, the principles of that
case-not any economic substance-rationally explain when and to
whom a distribution incident to a sale is a dividend.
Failure to perceive that there is no economic substance to a dividend
has led to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions. Sometimes those
decisions, like Waterman, defeat the legitimate expectations of the
taxpayer; at other times, as in PPG, they defeat the legitimate ex-
pectations of the Government.
II. Dividend or Sales Price: Bootstrap Acquisitions
A distribution by a corporation incident to a shareholder's sale or
exchange of its stock, if in redemption of the seller's shares, reduces
the number of shares a purchaser must acquire to obtain control. If
such a distribution takes the form of a dividend, it either lowers the
value of the shares to be acquired or (when paid after the acquisi-
tion) enables the purchaser to recover part of his acquisition cost.
In either case, the distribution uses the corporation's funds to finance
its own acquisition; for that reason such transactions are frequently
referred to as bootstrap acquisitions. Regardless of the procedure
used, the economic results are identical: the buyer has to furnish less
money of his own to purchase the corporation but winds up owning
a smaller company. For example, if a corporation has an equity which
buyer and seller agree is worth $1,000, the seller will receive $1,000
28. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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no matter what form the transaction takes. A distribution of, say,
$400, whether to seller or buyer, and whether as a dividend or in
redemption of stock, means only that the buyer is paying $600 from
his own assets for a corporation whose equity is now worth $600.
Since neither buyer nor seller is richer by reason of the distribution,
their negotiations as to the form of an acquisition will be governed
primarily by taxes-to whom and at what rate the corporate distribu-
tion (the $400 in the above example) will be taxed.29 The particular
form a bootstrap acquisition takes therefore has no economic sig-
nificance except its tax consequences. Given that the only substance
to the form chosen is the anticipated tax result itself, the question
becomes whether form alone can-or should-determine the tax result.
30
A. Waterman Steamship: Dividend as a
Function of Tax Avoidance
The approach to an answer perhaps best begins with Waterman
Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,31 in which form was overridden.
The seller in that case, Waterman Steamship Corporation, initially
was offered $3,500,000 for the stock of two of its subsidiaries, Pan-
Atlantic Steamship Corporation and Gulf Florida Terminal Com-
pany, Inc. Waterman did not accept, but offered instead to sell the
two companies for $700,000, after payment of dividends by them to
Waterman of $2,800,000. The $700,000 sales price equalled Water-
man's basis in the stock of the two companies. The parties agreed
to this arrangement, and on January 21, 1955, Pan-Atlantic declared
29. As stated in an analogous context: "[Tjhe presumcd tax consequences of the
transaction may . . . help to determine the total amount a purchaser is willing to pay
for ... a purchase." Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 858 (1967) (sellers of business held bound by amounts allocated in sale agreement
to covenant not to compete).
30. A review of the techniques used, and the tax differences which they cause, is
contained in Jassy, The Tax Treatment of Bootstrap Acquisitions: The Redemption
Route vs. The Dividend Route, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1459 (1974).
Jassy recommends that, regardless of the form used, a distribution to a seller that
does not reduce the buyer's purchase obligation should be treated as a redemption by
the transferred corporation if the tests of § 302(b) are met. Id. at 1479-82. Jassy rests this
recommendation on a desire to conform the bootstrap acquisition cases involving dividends
to those involving redemptions. Not only does that result in a purported economic sub-
stance; as Jassy himself implicitly recognizes, id. at 1478 n.67, his recommendation also
destroys the present conformity between dividends in taxable transactions and dividends
in tax-free reorganizations. Extension of his recommendation to a dividend declared to
the seller prior to a stock-for-stock exchange would mean that the dividend would
constitute consideration other than voting stock paid by the acquiring company. Thus,
the exchange could not qualify as a reorganization within the meaning of § 368(a)(l)(B),
which permits the acquiring company to give only voting stock. See pp. 895-96 & notes
136-37 infra.
31. 50 T.C. 650 (1968), rev'd, 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970).
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and paid to Waterman a dividend of $2,799,82032 in the form of a
promissory note due on February 20, 1955.
On the same day Waterman sold the stock of both companies to
McLean Securities Corporation (Securities), whose principal stock-
holder, McLean, guaranteed Pan-Atlantic's dividend note to Water-
man. McLean and Securities immediately loaned Pan-Atlantic enough
money to pay the note just distributed to Waterman, taking back
notes of Pan-Atlantic. Nearly six months later, in connection with
a public offering of Securities shares, the underwriters-who did not
want the note held by an individual-required McLean to exchange
his $2,500,000 Pan-Atlantic note for preferred stock of Securities.
Beyond doubt, Waterman structured the transaction to avoid capi-
tal gains tax on the amount-$2,799,820-by which the $3,500,000
cash received exceeded its tax basis in the stock of the two subsidiaries.
Since the tax basis to Pan-Atlantic and Gulf of their assets was more
than $3,500,000, the companies could have sold their assets to Se-
curities and distributed the cash to Waterman in liquidation without
any of the three corporations recognizing income.3 That avenue,
however, was foreclosed by a nontax consideration: an asset sale would
have required the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
a process which McLean did not want to undertake. Waterman in-
tended to reach the same result by eliminating the promissory note
from its income as a dividend from a corporation with which it filed
a consolidated return.34
The Tax Court majority opinion concluded that the $2,799,820 note
was a dividend rather than sales price on two principal grounds. First,
it held that
in negotiating for sales of corporate stock, . . . the parties may
properly so arrange the form of the transactions as to reduce or
eliminate the taxable income resulting therefrom .... [S]ubstance
should not be considered to differ from . . . form merely because
the same result might have been accomplished by the parties by
another method which would have produced a higher tax .... 1
32. Waterman's basis in the stock of the two companies actually proved to be $700,180.
The purchase price was increased by S180, and the dividend decreased to 52,799,820, to
reflect this fact; but neither the Tax Court nor the court of appeals discussed this minor
deviation from the contract.
33. Waterman's gain would not be recognized by reason of § 332, which permits the
tax-free liquidation of subsidiaries in which the parent owns 80% or more of the shares.
34. § 1502; Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14, as amended, T.D. 7246, 1973-1 C.B. 381.
35. 50 T.C. at 665.
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Second, because "there was no actual acceptance of the offer or legally
binding contract of sale . . . until after the dividend was declared
and the note delivered,"'36 it stated:
Where the parties to the sale are in agreement as to whether a
dividend is to be paid to the seller and the equitable interest in
the stock as well as legal title thereto remain in the seller until
after the dividend is declared and paid, the dividend is that of
the seller.
3 7
In other words, the Tax Court held that form does govern and that
Waterman used the correct form. Judge Tannenwald, joined by three
others, dissented. He reasoned that no dividend had in fact been paid,
because the original purchase price offered was $3,500,000 and the
funds which Pan-Atlantic used to pay its note to Waterman were
supplied by the purchaser.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, agreeing with the- Commissioner that
"irrespective of the form of the transaction, the substance . . .was
a payment by Securities to Waterman of $3,500,000 for the stock of
the subsidiaries" and that in substance Pan-Atlantic did not pay a
dividend to Waterman, but acted as a conduit for payment of the
purchase price.33 The court stated that "tax consequences must turn
upon the economic substance of a transaction and not upon the time
sequences or form," that a "new horizon of tax avoidance opportuni-
ties would be opened by allowing a tax free dividend, under Section
1502," and that a corporation would be able to "circumvent capital
gains treatment through a pre-sale extraction of earnings and profits." 9
The Internal Revenue Service's 1975 nonacquiescence in the Tax
Court majority opinion 40 does not mean that it subscribes to every
statement in the Fifth Circuit's reversal; but its later characterization
of Waterman as a case in which "the form of the transaction was a
sham designed to disguise the true substance of the transaction" 41 simi-
larly views substance and tax avoidance as the key concepts to under-
standing the nature of a dividend. Particularly when applied to the
facts in Waterman, the notion that a dividend embodies an economic
substance which must be preserved from tax avoidance schemes is
inconsistent with some compelling arguments:
1. But for the necessity of obtaining Interstate Commerce Com-
36. Id. at 661.
37. Id. at 666.
38. 430 F.2d at 1191, 1192.
39. Id. at 1192, 1195.
40. 1975-1 C.B. 3.
41. Rev. Rul. 75-493, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 8.
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mission approval, Waterman could have sold the assets of its sub-
sidiaries and received the $3,500,000 without paying any tax. Water-
man therefore sought only the same tax result that it unquestionably
could have achieved through a different form. Ultimately, then, all
that was avoided in Waterman was the necessity for obtaining ICC
approval of the transaction. Denying the benefits of consolidated return
dividends is a rather remote method of enforcing national transpor-
tation policy, even had the Fifth Circuit considered that it was doing
so. The Internal Revenue Service has accepted that § 269, its gen-
eralized tax avoidance statute, does not apply if the taxpayer could
have achieved the same tax benefit by using another form.42 Although
that acceptance covers only transactions within the scope of § 269,
the Service's ability to claim that a transaction must be recharac-
terized to accord with its true substance under court-developed tax
avoidance principles should be similarly limited.
2. Insofar as possible, the consolidated return regulations treat an
affiliated group of corporations as one taxpayer. Assuming the Water-
man group had filed consolidated tax returns during the years in
which Pan-Atlantic had accumulated the $2,799,820 of earnings and
profits that it distributed to Waterman,43 then-viewed as a unit-
the Waterman group had already paid tax on those earnings. The
transaction at issue, then, was an attempt by the Waterman group
to avoid being taxed again on the same earnings. Under the then-
applicable consolidated return regulations, taxation of those earnings
to the Waterman group did not correspondingly increase Waterman's
basis in the Pan-Atlantic stock. This discontinuity has been corrected.
44
Had the present regulations been in effect,45 Waterman's tax basis
in the stock would have been at least $2,799,820 higher, it could have
42. Section 269(a) permits the Service to disallow any "deduction, credit, or other
allowance" that arises from certain acquisitions by a taxpayer of control in or property
of a corporation if "the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion
or avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or
other allowance which such person . . . would not otherwise enjoy." In Cromwell Corp.,
43 T.C. 313 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 C.B. 4, (discussed p. 875 infra), the court
found that one form of a bootstrap acquisition did not violate § 269 because other forms
with the same tax consequences had received judicial approval. In light of this reason-
ing, the Waterman court's citations of Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967), which concerned a transaction entered into
with the expectation of economic loss, and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935),
as preventing Waterman from doing indirectly what it could not do directly, are wildly
inappropriate.
43. The Tax Court opinion states only that the Waterman group filed a consolidated
return for the year of sale. 50 T.C. at 651.
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-32(b)(1)(i), as amended, T.D. 7246, 1973-1 C.B. 381.
45. In relevant part, the present regulations were issued in 1966, well before the Fifth
Circuit's decision. T.D. 6909, 1967-1 C.B. 240, 248.
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sold the Pan-Atlantic stock to Securities without realizing any gain,
and no pre-sale distribution to Waterman would have been necessary.
The Fifth Circuit thus characterized as impermissible tax avoidance
an attempt to achieve the result now mandated by the present con-
solidated return regulations.
3. No tax principle decrees that dividends occur only in the form
of distributions. Under present law, if Pan-Atlantic had been a foreign
corporation, Waterman's gain upon the sale of its Pan-Atlantic stock
would have been taxed as a dividend;40 assuming that Pan-Atlantic
had paid foreign tax equal to the United States tax which it did pay
in respect of the $2,799,820, Waterman's gain would have gone un-
taxed in much the same way a consolidated return dividend would
have.47 Moreover, a shareholder can include dividends in his income
just by filing a consent with the Internal Revenue Service. Although
the statutory language indicates that a consent dividend is intended
to furnish relief from the accumulated earnings and personal holding
company taxes, nothing in the Code or regulations precludes its use
in a T1aterman-type transaction. 48 In an analogous situation, the Ser-
46. § 1248(a). The dividend, measured by the amount of post-1962 earnings and
profits, is limited to the amount of gain realized. The statutory association of dividends
with gain links two logically independent concepts, since taxation of a dividend distribu-
tion does not depend upon the recipient having increased his net worth. See pp. 879-80
infra. Nevertheless, the linkage persists, not only in the cases discussed in this article,
but also in §§ 1248 and 356(b) of the Code.
47. Had Pan-Atlantic been a controlled foreign corporation that after 1962 earned
$5,600,000 and paid foreign corporate tax of S2,800,000, it would have had $2,800,000 of
after-tax earnings. Pursuant to § 1248, Waterman's gain on the sale of stock to Securities
would have been taxed as a dividend. If Waterman had then elected the foreign tax
credit, §§ 78 and 902 would have required Waterman to include the entire $5,600,000 of
pre-tax earnings in its income; but Waterman would have received credit against its
United States tax liability for the S2,800,000 of foreign taxes paid. Assuming a 50%
United States tax rate, those provisions would have had the effect of eliminating United
States tax on the sale.
Waterman attempted tc achieve the same result by an intercompany dividend from a
United States company. The elimination of an intercompany dividend from Waterman's
income is a recognition that S2,800,000 of United States tax had been paid in respect of
the distributed profits, just as the foreign tax credit is a recognition that $2,800,000 of
foreign taxes had been paid in respect of the subsidiary's profits. It should therefore
not be considered tax avoidance to make the tax effects similar.
48. Section 565(a) provides that the amount specified in a consent shall constitute a
consent dividend for purposes of the deduction afforded by § 561, which deduction is
referred to in sections dealing with accumulated earnings and personal holding company
taxes, §§ 535(a) and 545(a). Section 565(c), however, provides that the consent shall be
effective for purposes of the entire Code, and § 7806(b) makes the grouping of the
consent dividend provisions near specific penalty taxes of no significance. Had Water-
man filed a consent to a dividend of $2,799,820, the tax treatment-assuming that the
consent were held effective-would have been as though Pan-Atlantic had distributed
S2,799,820 in cash to Waterman, which then contributed that amount to the capital of
Pan-Atlantic. § 565(c). Although the dividend would have been eliminated from income
by the consolidated return, the contribution to capital would have increased Water-
man's basis in the Pan-Atantic stock to $3,500,000 and eliminated the gain on the sale
of the stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.565-3(a) (1964).
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vice has not required a taxpayer to demonstrate that he is in danger
of incurring a penalty for not declaring dividends in order to elect
the intended relief.
49
Thus, even without a corporate distribution, dividends (a) can arise
in a sale context, and (b) can be created without the form of a
distribution. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, in the face
of a corporate distribution, that "in substance Pan-Atlantic neither
declared nor paid a dividend to Waterman,"' ° rests on a concept
of dividend incompatible with the results mandated in analogous
situations.
The court did not specifically discuss the tax treatment of McLean
and Securities, the buyers. But if a note can be issued as a dividend,"'
the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit that the cash advanced by McLean
and Securities should be treated as purchase price makes inescapable
a conclusion that McLean and Securities did not give Pan-Atlantic
any consideration for the $2,799,820 of notes received. Therefore, Pan-
Atlantic must be considered to have distributed those notes as a
dividend to Securities, of which $2,500,000 was in turn distributed to
McLean.
5 2
Waterman, then, implicitly accepted the Service's view that the
economic substance of a distribution to the seller incident to a boot-
strap acquisition is a dividend to the buyer. More recently, the
Service has alternatively explained Waterman on the ground that the
buyer furnished the funds used by Pan-Atlantic to pay its note to
Waterman,5" overlooking--as did Judge Tannenwald's dissent-the fact
49. Rev. Rul. 75-111, 1975-1 C.B. 251 (taxpayer permitted to make minimum dis-
tribution election regardless of whether it has subpart F income for year).
50. 430 F.2d at 1192.
51. The Fifth Circuit stated that whether as a matter of law a note may be issued in
payment of a dividend was not litigated in the Tax Court. Id. at 1185 n.1. However,
there is authority that indicates that a note may be treated as a dividend. § 956
(obligations of United States companies treated as dividends in certain calculations of
income of controlled foreign corporations); Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1956) (debentures found to constitute bona fide dividend); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.301-1(d), as amended, T.D. 7293, 1973-2 C.B. 228 (describing how to calculate amount
of dividend when company distributes its obligations). Even if the issuance of a note for
no consideration would not be taxed as a dividend, its payment would be.
52. Since Securities, the actual purchaser, was a corporation, the tax effect of a
dividend to it from Pan-Atlantic could be nullified by the same consolidated return
provision that Waterman was attempting to use. See Cromwell Corp., 43 T.C. 313 (1961).
acquiesced in, 1965-2 C.B. 4, in which an individual avoided dividend tax by forming a
holding company to borrow funds and make the stock purchase. The borrowing was
repaid by means of a dividend from the purchased corporation to its holding company
parent, which dividend was eliminated from consolidated taxable income. The fact that
McLean, who ended up owning the notes of Pan-Atlantic, had an interest in Pan-Atlantic
only through Securities would mean that Pan-Atlantic constructively distributed the
notes to Securities, which in turn distributed them to McLean.
53. Rev. Rul. 75-493, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 8. See p. 893 infra.
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that the note rather than the cash was intended to be the dividend.5 4
This explanation, however, represents only the latest in a long series
of inconsistent perceptions by the Service of the economic substance
of a dividend in a bootstrap acquisition. Because intercorporate divi-
dends are taxed at a rate below the capital gains rate, the Service
generally prefers that distributions to corporations be characterized
as purchase price (and hence taxable at capital gain rates) rather than
as dividends, but that distributions (whether actual or constructive) to
individuals be treated as dividends. Thus, as discussed in the following
sections, the Service has frequently perceived the substance of a boot-
strap distribution as what is most beneficial to the federal revenues.
In some cases (Zenz v. Quinlivan5 and Steel Improvement & Forge
Co. v. Commissioner5 6 ), this ad hoc approach has resulted in the
Service arguing that the substance of a distribution to the seller in-
cident to a bootstrap acquisition was a dividend to the seller; in
others (Arthur J. Kobacker,5 7 Cromwell Corp.,os and by implica-
tion Waterman), a dividend to the buyer.
The reason why the Service, as well as buyers and sellers, has been
able to argue either side as to the economic substance of a distribu-
tion in the context of a bootstrap acquisition is simple: there is no
independent economic substance to a distribution. Its economic ef-
fect is the tax result, but the rationales advanced by the cases have
so obscured this fact that the law in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits is
almost in chaos. Moreover, the Service could not entirely contain the
consequences of Waterman even if it wished to do so, because indi-
vidual sellers will continue to cite that case to show that formally
declared dividends paid to them should be treated as capital gain.5 9
To see how the confusion has come about, in order to undo the
damage, it is necessary to go into a little tax history.
54. The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit differs from Judge Tannenwald's Tax Court
dissent, which stated as "plain unadulterated fact" that "no dividend was declared or
paid by Pan-Atlantic to Waterman or anyone else" (emphasis added). 50 T.C. at 666.
That statement, based on McLean's original offer of S3,500,000 and the funds supplied
by the purchaser, does not take into account the S2,500,000 Pan-Atlantic note to McLean,
which the underwriters recognized as real enough. Including its debt to Securities, Pan-
Atlantic had 52,799,820 less in net worth after the transaction than it had before; it there-
fore must have made a distribution to someone. That fact would have stood out more
clearly if, rather than supplying Pan-Atlantic with cash to pay the note distributed to
Waterman, McLean and Securities had simply bought the note from Waterman.
55. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. i954).
56. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
57. 37 T.C. 882 (1962), acquiesced in, 1964-2 C.B. 6.
58. 43 T.C. 313 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 C.B. 4.
59. See Casner v. Commissioner, 450 F.2d 379, 389-92, 395-96 (5th Cir. 1971); pp. 888-93
infra.
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B. From Zenz to Cromwell: The Service's Acceptance of Form
1. The Meaning of Zenz
More than 20 years ago, in Zenz v. Quinlivan,60 the Sixth Circuit
rejected the Government's attempt to recharacterize a redemption as
a dividend. In Zenz, an individual shareholder in a close corporation
first sold part of her shares in that corporation to a third party and
then, pursuant to the same plan, had her remaining shares redeemed
by' the corporation. The lower court, finding this procedure a cir-
cuitous and unsuccessful attempt to avoid taxable dividend treatment,
held that the redemption distribution should be treated as a dividend
to the seller. Reversing, the Sixth Circuit stated:
[W]e are satisfied that where the taxpayer effects a redemption
which completely extinguishes [his] interest in the corporation,
and does not retain any beneficial interest whatever, that such
transaction is not the equivalent of the distribution of a taxable
dividend as to him ...
S. .[Treatment of a redemption as a taxable dividend] con-
templated that the shareholder receiving the distribution will
remain in the corporation .... 61
Three points about Zenz are significant for this analysis: first, the
Sixth Circuit's reference to "beneficial interest," which later was to
become the same circuit's criterion of substance in Steel Improvement
& Forge Co. v. Commissioner;62 second, the Service's announcements
that it would follow Zenz under both the Internal Revenue Codes of
1939 and of 1954;63 and third, that despite its purported criterion of
economic substance, Zenz was at bottom a decision upholding form-
it permitted but did not require distributions to a seller incident to
a bootstrap acquisition to be characterized as a redemption of the
seller's stock. Indicative of this respect for form is the fact that, prior
to Steel Improvement, both sellers and buyers in bootstrap acquisitions
who received distributions in the form of a dividend (rather than, as
in Zenz, a redemption) had little success in arguing that substance
required integration of the dividend and stock sale to reach a Zenz-
60. 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954), rev'g 106 F. Supp. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
61. Id. at 917.
62. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963). See pp. 885-88 infra.
63. Rev. Rul. 54-458, 1954-2 C.B. 167 (1939 Code); Rev. Rul. 55-745, 1955-2 C.B. 223
(1954 Code).
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type result.04 Soon after Zenz, the Sixth Circuit itself replied to that
argument as follows:
[Since taxpayers could have achieved their purpose by the Zenz
form], it can be argued that to permit the decision of the Tax
Court to stand is to permit form to triumph over substance. Yet,
to the extent here implied, it is form which often must prevail,
when the delicate question involved is whether the extraction of
a corporation's earned surplus has been accomplished at less than
the rates taxed upon ordinary income.3
The Service, on the other hand, which had conceded that the Zenz
form could avoid a taxable dividend, nevertheless persisted in claiming
that other methods nontaxable in form must as a matter of substance
be recharacterized as taxable dividends. In Arthur J. Kobacker06 for
example, an individual buyer of a corporation assigned his purchase
contract to a holding company formed to borrow, purchase the stock,
and repay the loan with funds of the acquired corporation. Repayment
was accomplished by merging the holding company into the acquired
subsidiary, which succeeded to the debt by operation of law. A similar
nontaxable form was employed in Cromwell Corp.,67 in which a hold-
ing company made the purchase of the corporation in question and
repaid its acquisition loan by causing the subsidiary to pay a dividend
to it. The dividend was eliminated from the holding company's in-
come because the two companies filed a consolidated return.
In each case the Service characterized the use of an acquired com-
pany's assets to finance the purchase of its own stock as a taxable
dividend, considered the conjunction of the stock purchase with a
downstream merger or consolidated return dividend, respectively, to
fit that characterization, and attempted to find a dividend to tax. 8
61. In Sam E. Wilson, Jr., 27 T.C. 976 (1957), for example, the taxpayer received a
distribution in the form of a cancellation of indebtedness after he had contracted to
sell his stock. He argued that since the distribution reduced the amount otherwise pay-
able by the buyer under the contract, it should be regarded as a prepayment of purchase
price. The court, disagreeing, noted that "[w]e cannot make such a holding because the
contract specifically provides otherwise." Id. at 982 (emphasis added). In Television
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960), the court rejected the redeem-
ing buyer's argument that in substance its transaction should be treated as though the
Zenz form had been used.
65. Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719, 724 (6th Cir. 1955).
66. 37 T.C. 882 (1962), acquiesced in, 1964-2 C.B. 6.
67. 43 T.C. 313 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2 C.B. 4.
68. In Kobacker, the purported dividend was the payment by the acquired company
of the holding company's debt assumed in the merger. The alleged recipients were the
former shareholders of the holding company, who by reason of the merger became direct
owners of the acquired company. 37 T.C. at 892-93. In Cromwell, the Service argued that
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Both opinions rejected that position, and by acquiescence the Service
also repudiated it. In the process, however, two things happened: the
result of Zenz was elevated from form to substance, and substance
became more firmly associated with economic benefit.
2. Form Governs, But the Language is Substance and Benefit
Both Kobacker and Cromwell upheld the effectiveness of the form
chosen by the respective taxpayers. The language used by those cases,
however, indicates that the decisions were based on the substantive
question of whether the ultimate purchaser received an economic
benefit. Kobacker, citing Zenz twice in a key paragraph, accepted the
taxpayer's argument that his own transaction basically was the non-
taxable "buying into a corporation simultaneously with complete re-
tirement of its old shareholders."0 9 But Zenz did not mean that all
distributions incident to bootstrap acquisitions were required to be
transmuted into the form of seller redemptions; in Steel Improve-
ment & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, for example, the Sixth Circuit
recognized that such a distribution was dividend income to one of
the two parties.30 Moreover, the reason asserted in Zenz to explain
why a distribution need not in substance be a dividend to the seller
-that the recipient was terminating his interest in the corporation
-does not apply to the buyer.
Thus, Zenz does not make Kobacker logically inevitable; a more
practical justification for the Kobacker result was the Service's failure
to take a consistent position that the substance of distributions in-
cident to an acquisition is always a dividend to the buyer or, if it
had reversed its acquiescence to Zenz after more than 15 years, always
a dividend to the seller. By not determining that a bootstrap acqui-
sition can have only one substance for tax purposes, the Service had
implicitly conceded that the same economic transaction can have dif-
ferent tax consequences depending on the way the transaction is struc-
tured; and if tax result flows from structure rather than economic
realities, the tax substance of a bootstrap acquisition is the structure
-in other words, the form-used.
Rather than deciding on the basis of the Service's implicit con-
since the holding company was formed to avoid the taxable dividend needed to finance
the purchase if the individual shareholders of the holding company had made the
acquisition directly, § 269 should be applied to prevent elimination of the dividend in
a consolidated return. 43 T.C. at 317, 321.
69. 37 T.C. at 893. See Cromwell Corp., 43 T.C. 313, 319 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-2
C.B. 4 (same argument presented).
70. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963). See pp. 885-86 infra.
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cession, however, the court in Kobacker looked for an economic sub-
stance to the distribution:
Petitioners were personally unable to meet the $475,000 price
... .For the $175,000 which they paid for the stock of [the
holding company], petitioners acquired no more than an equity
in [the purchased company] subject to its [$300,000] indebted-
ness. . . .The later merger of [the holding company] into [the
purchased company] resulted in no greater economic benefit to
petitioners, aside from operational savings. Their interest in [the
purchased company] was still subject to the indebtedness incurred
by [the holding company] and assumed [in the merger] .71
In other words, the transaction did not result in a dividend because
it left the buyers no richer than before!
Cromwell still more explicitly associates the underlying substance
of a dividend with economic benefit. That decision could have rested
on the limited ground that no tax avoidance was involved, since the
same result was available through the alternatives of Kobacker or
Zenz. 7 2 The Cromwell court, however, also went on to give its idea
of what the underlying substance of a dividend was, first by quoting
the above passage from Kobacker, and then by citing Milton F.
Priester73 and referring to two cases on which Priester relied, Holsey
v. Commissioner74 and Niederkrome v. Commissioner.75 All three
cases held that the redemption of a retiring shareholder's stock did not
constitute a constructive dividend to the remaining shareholders. In
Priester, the reason was that the remaining shareholder "received no
financial or economic benefit from the transaction";70 in Nieder-
krome, there was no "receipt of financial or economic advantage."77
In Holsey, the corporation exercised an option, assigned to it by one
of its two shareholders, to purchase the other shareholder's stock at
a bargain price. The court conceded that the remaining shareholder
71. 37 T.C. at 895. The court added that although taxpayer's stock might become more
valuable as the debt was repaid and the corporation was able to pay greater dividends,
such appreciation would be taxed only when the stock was sold. This assumes that pay-
ment of an obligation increases net worth; but stock does not appreciate by payment of
a debt any more than it depreciates when the corporation or shareholder borrows
money. In both instances the change in assets is matched by a corresponding change in
liabilities.
72. Cromwell involved the application of § 269, the Code's generalized tax-avoidance
statute, which does not apply where the taxpayer could have received the same tax
result by using another form. See p. 870 supra.
73. 38 T.C. 316 (1962).
74. 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958).
75. 266 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 915 (1959).
76. This description of Priester is set forth in Cromwell, 43 T.C. at 319.
77. 266 F.2d at 244, quoted in Priester, 38 T.C. at 328.
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had benefited "indirectly" by an increase in the value of his stock,
yet it went on to state:
But where, as here, the taxpayer was never under any legal ob-
ligation to purchase the stock held by the other stockholder, ...
the distribution did not discharge any obligation of his and did
not benefit him in any direct sense.7s
Priester, Niederkrome, Holsey, and by implication the Service's
acquiescence in Cromwell speak in terms of economic benefit. By
contrast, Revenue Ruling 69-608,79 which deals with the same ques-
tion of when a redemption of a retiring shareholder's stock is a con-
structive dividend to the remaining shareholder, does not speak in
such terms. It does, however, view a dividend as more than a purely
formal transaction. The criterion in the ruling is that if the remaining
shareholder is subject to an "unconditional obligation" to purchase
the stock, "the satisfaction by the corporation of his obligation results
in a constructive distribution to him"; on the other hand, where his
obligation is only secondary-for example, by having to purchase
stock only if the corporation does not-the redemption is not a con-
structive distribution to him. 0
Under the approach of Revenue Ruling 69-608, identical corporate
redemptions can have different tax results because of the existence
of executory purchase contracts which are never consummated. A tax
difference which rests upon the terms of executory contracts can best
be explained not by any economic substance, but by reference to the
tax rules developed with respect to such contracts, regardless of whether
the contracts are between present shareholders or, as in Zenz, between
a present and prospective shareholder. Instead, the search for a ra-
tionale based on some economic substance of dividends has invited
confusion. To illustrate, the talk of the substance of dividends in
Zenz, Kobacker, and Cromwell obscured the fact that in all three
cases form determined the result. Similarly, the equation of that sub-
stance with economic benefit obscured the fact that, unless incon-
sistent with the sale terms negotiated by the parties, form should
determine result; and it has prevented both the courts and the Service
from seeing that only the tax rules developed to analyze the sub-
78. 258 F.2d at 868. Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 C.B. 920, states that the Service will
follow Holsey.
79. 1969-2 G.B. 43.
80. Compare id. Situation 5 with id. Situation 2. The redemption can be a constructive
dividend, however, if the corporation pays more than fair market value for the stock
received.
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stance of a sale-not any concept of economic benefit-correctly ex-
plain why satisfaction by a corporation of a shareholder's executory
contract to purchase its stock should be taxed to him as a dividend.
C. The Origin of Economic Benefit as the
Substance of Dividends
The unfortunate linkage of dividend with economic benefit, which
implied that a dividend increased net worth, has distracted courts
from an initial perception of dividend as an increase only in the
amount of a shareholder's assets outside corporate solution. The
linkage had its beginnings in 1929, when the Supreme Court, in Old
Colony Trust Company v. Commissioner,8' held that the payment of
an employee's taxes by his employer should be treated as though the
funds had been paid directly to the employee and used by him to
discharge the obligation. That discharge, which did (unlike a divi-
dend) increase the employee's net worth, later was described correctly
by the Supreme Court as for his "benefit."8 2
Next, Wall v. United States 3 applied the Old Colony rationale
to a case where discharge of the obligation did not increase the debtor's
net worth, but did result in funds moving from corporate solution
to the taxpayer. In Wall, one shareholder in a corporation had pur-
chased all the stock of the other shareholder for its fair market value,
giving a note in return. Rather than pay the note with personal
funds, the debtor later surrendered the purchased stock to the cor-
poration in consideration of its paying his debt. The court reasoned
that a third party's payment of a debt owed by the taxpayer
is regarded as the same as if the money had been paid to the
taxpayer and transmitted by him to the creditor; and so if a
corporation, instead of paying a dividend to a stockholder, pays
a debt for him out'of its surplus, it is the same for tax purposes
as if the corporation pays a dividend to a stockholder, and the
stockholder then utilizes it to pay his debt.8 4
Although holding that payment of the debtor's note was a dividend
distribution to him, the court refrained from use of the word "benefit."
Indeed, the taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that the usual dividend
81. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
82. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935).
83. 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). Wall cites both Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1
(1935) and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), for the proposi-
tion that "payment of a taxpayer's indebtedness by a third party pursuant to an agree-
ment between them is income to the taxpayer." 164 F.2d at 464.
84. 164 F.2d at 464.
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rule should not apply to him, because he had not received any gain
by reason of his purchase and the corporation's subsequent redemption
of those shares.s5 As a matter of economics, of course, the taxpayer
could not have received any gain from the corporation's assumption
of the debt and cancellation of the redeemed shares, because he was
the sole shareholder."s The gain that resulted from causing the cor-
poration to assume his debt was exactly offset by the loss in value
to his solely-owned company, which now owed a debt to a third party
for which it had never received any corresponding asset. The effect,
then, was a transfer of net worth out of corporate solution and a
corresponding increase in the amount of the shareholder's beneficially
owned assets outside corporate solution. Thus the Wall court cor-
rectly perceived that it is the transfer of assets out of corporate so-
lution, not any economic benefit to the shareholder, that is the mea-
sure of a dividend.
By 1965, however-18 years after Wall-the identification of divi-
dend with benefit (in Kobacker, Cromwell, Priester, and other cases)
had become sufficiently pervasive that a court felt compelled to jus-
tify dividend taxation by characterizing a corporation's discharge of
its shareholder's obligation as an economic benefit to the shareholder
even though it did not increase the shareholder's net worth. In Sulli-
van v. United States,s7 a corporation satisfied its shareholder's execu-
tory obligation to purchase additional stock in the company at its
fair market value. Responding to the argument that a dividend re-
quired an economic benefit to the shareholder as well as the discharge
of an obligation owed by the shareholder, the district court stated
that the "economic benefit .. .in this case was the discharge by the
corporation ...of [the obligation] to purchase ... stock."s Relief
85. The taxpayer argued that he received no taxable gain from his transactions be-
cause he paid more for the retiring shareholder's interest than the proportionate claim
of those shares on the company's assets. He further contended that any economic benefit
from his dealings could only be measured by waiting until he ultimately disposed of his
shares. Id. at 465. To this argument the court responded:
While this statement may be true, it is entirely beside the point. We are not now
concerned with the broad question whether the business .. .will ultimately result
to his advantage and show a profit on his investment . . . , but with the much
narrower question whether in 1939 the taxpayer in legal effect received a dividend
from the corporation through the payment by it of the S5,000 note ....
Id.
86. In rejecting the taxpayer's argument that his surrender of stock constituted
consideration for the corporation's assumption of his debt, the court pointed out that
the surrender of stock did not affect his 100% interest. Id.
87. 244 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1965), ajf'd, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 905 (1967).
88. Id. at 623 (emphasis added). The court of appeals agreed, stating:
It is true that in terms of the financial worth of Sullivan's interest in the corpora-
tion, it was the same after the transaction as it was before. The transaction still
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from an obligation to purchase at fair market value does not, of
course, economically benefit the purchaser any more than would a
mutual agreement with the seller to cancel the contract.
To summarize, substance had become associated with benefit in
stages. In Old Colony, payment of the employee's debt increased his
net worth; and because the payment benefited him, it was considered
as constructively made to him. In Wall, where payment of the share-
holder's debt did not increase his net worth, the payment was con-
sidered as constructively made to him. By Sullivan, however, payment
of an executory obligation which, as in Wall, did not increase net
worth, was considered as benefiting the shareholder because it was con-
structively made to him. The logical fallacy of that conclusion re-
sembles the reasoning that because all dogs are four-legged animals,
all four-legged animals are dogs. In fact, because payments which
increase someone's net worth are considered made to him does not
mean that constructive payments to him increase his net worth. The
question for dividend purposes is not whether the distribution in-
creases the net worth of a shareholder: no dividend is an economic
benefit to him. Rather, the question is whether the transfer of cor-
porate funds can be considered to satisfy his debt and therefore to
constitute a distribution to him under Wall. As discussed in the
following section, the answer to that question turns not on the pur-
ported substance or benefit of a dividend, but on the substance of
negotiations.
D. Why Court Holding Reconciles the Cases:
Substance As Negotiation
Because both the district court and the court of appeals in Sullivan
were looking for the substance of a dividend, they were unable to
analyze why satisfaction of a shareholder's executory obligation-which
is not an indebtedness-should come within the discharge of indebt-
edness principle of Wall. Indeed, the taxpayers in Sullivan attempted
to distinguish a contractual obligation to purchase stock from payment
of already-incurred indebtedness. To this the district court replied
that "[n]o authority has been found which will support this not
wholly clear contention."89 But the district court could not-or at
resulted in an economic benefit to Sullivan, however, because he was relieved of his
personal obligation to purchase Nelson's stock.
363 F.2d at 729 (footnote omitted).
89. 244 F. Supp. at 617. The court treated as a separate argument the contention
that the obligation was "executory," misconstruing the word to mean that an obligation
is executory until it is unconditional. In fact, the single argument is that an executory
purchase obligation, even if unconditional, is not yet an indebtedness.
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any rate did not-explain why the three decisions on which it pri-
marily relied would support a conclusion that redemption of stock
which a remaining shareholder "was unconditionally and primarily
obligated to purchase" 90 constituted a dividend to him. Two of those
decisions, Wall and Woodworth v. Commissioner,"9 concerned pay-
ment of indebtedness; the third, Holsey v. Commissioner,92 did not
involve an unconditional obligation.
Despite the lack of explanation in Sullivan, that case is the only
authority cited by the Service in Revenue Ruling 69-608 to support
taxability on the basis of a primary and unconditional executory
obligation to purchase. 93 However, when a corporation pays a debt
incurred by a shareholder, as in Wall, the shareholder has already
received the money, stock, or other property for which the debt was
incurred. The corporation's payment of that debt, which increases
the amount of the shareholder's beneficially owned assets outside
corporate solution, can therefore be considered a distribution to him.
By contrast, when a corporation satisfies a shareholder's executory
obligation to purchase shares at fair market value, as in Sullivan, the
shareholder who executed the contract has not yet actually received
the stock which he has agreed to purchase. Since the amount of assets
in corporate solution attributable to the purchasing shareholder's pre-
viously owned stock will not change, a distribution of assets to satisfy
the shareholder's executory obligation to purchase additional stock
increases the amount of his assets outside corporate solution only if
it is assumed that he has owned in corporate solution an amount of
assets attributable to the additional stock. Therefore, to fit Sullivan
within the principle of Wall, stock that in Wall had actually been
purchased prior to the redemption must by reason of the executory
contract be treated as having been constructively purchased by the
shareholder and then redeemed for payment of the purchase indebt-
edness.
Sullivan can be recast to fit the facts of Wall not because of any
economic substance of dividends common to both cases, but because
90. Id. at 616.
91. 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955).
92. 258 F.2d 865, 866 (3d Cir. 1958), discussed at pp. 877-78 supra. Holsey does state
that the criterion of a dividend is whether the remaining shareholder has an uncondi-
tional obligation to purchase, 258 F.2d at 868, citing in support of this proposition first
Wall, then Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957), and Zipp v. Commissioner,
259 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 934 (1959). Ferro, however, involved a
release from an executed contract, while Zipp seems sui generis-involving the abandon-
ment by a principal shareholder, in return for a distribution from the corporation, of
certain conditions he had attached to the gift of shares to his sons.
93. 1969-2 C.B. 43, Situation 1. For a discussion of this ruling, see p. 878 supra.
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of the principles of tax law applying to sales. The definitive expres-
sion of those principles is Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 4 which
concerned negotiations by a corporation to sell its sole asset, an apart-
ment building. After oral agreement (unenforceable at that point un-
der the relevant state law) had been reached with the prospective
purchasers, the selling corporation's attorney advised that the cor-
poration could not consummate the sale because of the large tax that
it would thereby incur. Very soon thereafter, the attorney met with
the selling corporation's shareholders and directors, who took the
procedural steps to liquidate the company and distribute the apart-
ment building to the shareholders. A contract of sale on the same
terms previously agreed to-but with the shareholders rather than
the corporation as seller-was then executed and carried out.90
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that the
building should be considered as having been sold by the corporation
rather than its shareholders, stating that "[t]he incidence of taxation
depends upon the substance of the transaction." 96 That statement
cannot refer to economic substance-the terms of the sale-since apart
from the anticipated tax consequence the identity of the seller was
a matter of indifference to the parties. The statement refers instead
to the substance which tax law accords negotiations as to the manner
in which a transaction will occur. Had negotiations leading up to
the same contract been conducted solely on behalf of the shareholders,
they, rather than the corporation, would have been considered to
have made the sale.97
The "substance" to which Court Holding refers therefore does not
prevent a taxpayer from casting a sale, including a bootstrap acqui-
sition, in the form best designed to minimize tax. What the Court's
94. 324 U.S. 331 (1945), rev'g 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'g 2 T.C. 531 (1943).
95. 2 T.C. at 532-36. The shareholders intended to avoid tax on gain at the corporate
level. Gain at the shareholder level would be recognized regardless of whether the
liquidating corporation distributed the building or sale proceeds. An effective distribu-
tion of the building, however, would have given the shareholders a cost basis for the
property equal to its then fair market value, and therefore they would not have realized
any gain upon its subsequent sale by them. By contrast, the corporation's cost basis for
the building was low, and taxable gain was therefore recognized at the corporate (as
well as at the shareholder) level by treating the corporation as having made the sale and
distributed the proceeds.
96. 324 U.S. at 334.
97. See United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), in which
similar tax considerations caused a corporation to reject an offer to purchase its assets.
The shareholders of the corporation then offered to acquire the assets and sell them
to the prospective buyer. This offer was accepted, 'the assets distributed in partial
liquidation, and the sale consummated. Commenting that The distinction between that
case and Court Holding was "shadowy and artificial," 338 U.S. at 454, the Supreme
Court nevertheless affirmed a decision that in substance the sale had been made by
shareholders.
The Yale Law Journal
use of the term does mean is that the form of distribution and sale
selected must be consistent with the negotiations leading up to the
transaction. The tax principles applicable to distributions in com-
plete liquidation incident to a sale-the facts of Court Holding-are
equally applicable to partial distributions incident to a bootstrap
acquisition. A search for the economic substance of those distributions
is fruitless; instead, a court must focus on "negotiation substance."
If the negotiations are consistent with the form of distribution and
sale carried out by the parties, that form should determine the tax
consequences.
The above approach provides a logically satisfying explanation of
why Sullivan and Wall should reach the same tax result. Sullivan is
the obverse of Court Holding. In Court Holding, a corporation which
had negotiated and agreed to the sale was treated by the court as
having made the sale and then transferred the cash consideration
to its shareholders, although the shareholders actually carried out the
sales contract. Application of that principle to Sullivan means that
the shareholder who had negotiated and agreed to the stock purchase
should be treated as having made the purchase and then transferred
the consideration received (the stock) to the corporation, although the
corporation actually satisfied the purchase contract. Had the share-
holder in Sullivan actually made the purchase, he would have owed
the seller money. Since under that construction the corporation would
have satisfied a debt rather than an executory obligation, the facts
are parallel to those in Wall.
Failure to articulate this underlying similarity of Wall and Sullivan,
however, results in obscuring the concept of dividend as simply an
increase in assets outside corporate solution. Upon that concept rests
the ability to distinguish a situation in which such increase occurs
with respect to the taxed shareholder-as in Wall and Sullivan-from
one in which it does not, as in Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v.
Commissioner.9" The Sixth Circuit in Steel Improvement did not
have a clear idea of what a dividend distribution is; for that very
reason-as explained in the following section-its holding takes a step
beyond Wall and Sullivan without realizing that it is doing so.
E. The Conceptual Flaw of Steel Improvement: Dividends
Without an Increase in Non-Corporate Assets
Zenz, Kobacker, Sullivan, and Cromwell reached the correct results.
However, their essentially meaningless reasoning-the concept of divi-
98. 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'g 36 T.C. 265 (1961).
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dend distribution as a substantive event-raised the possibility that
such a concept could be used to justify the wrong result. That pos-
sibility was realized in Steel Improvement. There the taxpayer, an
American corporation, sold all the stock of its Canadian subsidiary.
The buyer, in order to avoid a Canadian tax on distribution to it
of the subsidiary's accumulated earnings,99 negotiated to purchase a
company without earnings. Accordingly, the sales contract provided
that prior to closing the subsidiary could pay the taxpayer, its parent,
a dividend of 5116,000.100 The taxpayer was willing to receive the
$116,000 dividend because it expected to receive a foreign tax credit
that would offset any United States tax on the distribution.
That belief turned out to be mistaken. After the sale, the buyer
caused the subsidiary to make an election which resulted in a refund
of the Canadian tax for which the taxpayer-seller had claimed a foreign
tax credit. The American seller, faced with the possibility that loss
of the credit for the refunded Canadian tax would result in addi-
tional American tax calculated at the ordinary income rate, then re-
versed the position taken on its return and claimed that the $116,000
distribution constituted part of the purchase price it had received on
the sale of its subsidiary and therefore was taxable to it at the lower
capital gain rate. The Service convinced the Tax Court majority
that the $116,000 dividend declared and paid to the seller prior to
closing the sale was the seller's dividend income:
[We agree with the Service] that it was the intention of the
parties that the dividend be paid to [the seller]; that the dividend
was not a part of the purchase price since the contract of sale
permitted but did not require that a dividend be paid to the
extent of [$116,000, without] adjustment to the purchase price
; that [seller] was in control of the corporation at the time
the dividend was declared; . . . that the dividend was paid while
[seller] was still owner of the stock; [and] that both the purchaser
and [seller] planned the transaction as a dividend to [seller] in
substance as well as in form .... 10-1
99. Because the S116,000 was characterized as "designated surplus" under Canadian
law, its distribution to the Canadian buyer would not, unlike other Canadian inter-
corporate dividends, be offset by a 100% deduction. See 36 T.C. at 272-73.
100. The contract actually provided that a dividend of up to $180,000 could be
declared, but that a dividend of less than that amount would increase the purchase
price, up to a maximum increase of $64,000. Id. at 268. The effect of this provision was
that the seller could extract up to $116,000 from its subsidiary without affecting the
buyer's maximum offer (his nominal offer plus $64,000); the seller could further extract
up to another S64,000, but in doing so would reduce the price received from the buyer
pro tanto. Only .116,000, then, could have been considered a dividend from the sub-
sidiary to the buyer.
101. 36 T.C. at 273-74.
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That passage neatly summarizes the taxpayer's position in Waterman,
a position which the Service opposed. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's
reversal of the Tax Court in Steel Improvement only compounds the
effect of the Service's inconsistency, because when the Service was
right (Steel Improvement) it lost; 102 and when it was wrong (Water-
man) it won.
In reversing the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the
substance of the transaction depended on the "beneficial ownership"
of the stock at the time the distribution was made. Despite the Tax
Court's findings, the court of appeals determined that the buyer was
the beneficial owner of the stock at the time the $116,000 distribution
was made and that therefore the $116,000 was a dividend to it, on
the ground that it was then the "party who bears the operating risks
of the business and stands to benefit from profits or suffer detriment
from losses.' 1 ° 3 That formulation presents some difficulties.
First, if benefiting from profits were the proper criterion, it would
be more appropriate to tax a distribution of accumulated profits to
the seller, who economically benefited from the accumulation of those
profits, rather than to the buyer, who will benefit only from accumu-
lation of other profits. Had the profits of the distributing Canadian
subsidiary in Steel Improvement been earned after 1962, § 1248 would
prescribe that result regardless of whether the distribution were charac-
terized as dividend or purchase price.
0 4
Second, the formulation assumes its conclusion. The buyer cannot
beneficially own more by executory contract than he will own after
the contract is executed. The question to be decided, not assumed, is
what stock the buyer has contracted to purchase (the standard of
Revenue Ruling 69-608) or negotiated to purchase (the standard of
Court Holding):'0 5 stock of a corporation which does not include the
102. As Steel Improvement was framed by the parties and the court, the Service was
right. However, neither the parties nor the court took into account the source of the
funds used to pay the dividend. The S116,000 received by the seller may have been
indirectly supplied by the buyer, with the subsidiary acting as a conduit for part of the
purchase price. See note 139 infra. The Service's attempt to tax the $116,000 as a dividend
to the seller would then have been incorrect.
103. 314 F.2d at 98. Had the court confronted its earlier paean to form in Wood-
worth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955) (quoted at p. 875 supra), it might
have had more difficulty in deciding as it did.
104. See p. 871 supra.
105. Because Rev. Rul. 69-608, 69-2 C.B. 43 (discussed at p. 878), relies on Sullivan,
its determination of the stage at which agreement substantively determines tax result
differs from that of Court Holding. Whereas Court Holding would treat as seller the
person who negotiates the sale, Rev. Rul. 69-608 treats a remaining shareholder as
the purchaser of redeemed shares only if he has a "primary and unconditional obliga-
tion" under the contract. The difference, then, is whether one looks to the negotiations
or the contract to determine what agreement should be given effect.
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distributed profits, or stock of one which does. The answer to that
question depends on substance, but as previously indicated it is the
substance of intent, not of distributions. The Tax Court saw this,
and its holding that the Steel Improvement dividend was taxable to
the seller cited T.J. Coffey, Jr.1'0 In Coffey, the buyer did not want
to acquire the corporation with a particular asset, called the Cabot
payment, which was accordingly distributed to the seller before clos-
ing. The Tax Court decided the dividend was that of the seller, stating:
The purchasers did not agree to buy their stock and then turn
over to them $190,000 and the Cabot payment in consideration
therefor. From the testimony . . . it is apparent that they were
not interested in the Cabot payment, did not want it included
in the assets of the corporation at the time they acquired its stock,
and negotiated with the [sellers] to acquire stock of a corporation
whose assets did not include the unwanted Cabot payment.
10 7
In like manner, for tax rather than business reasons the buyers in
Steel Improvement and Zenz intended to acquire stock of a corpora-
tion without accumulated profits; but only in Steel Improvement did
the Sixth Circuit feel that "substance" should defeat such intention.
0 8
The third essential difficulty with the Sixth Circuit's beneficial
ownership test is that since the distribution did not increase the
buyer's noncorporate assets, either actually or constructively under
Court Holding, the concept of dividend on which the result rests has
no coherence. The court likened the buyer's situation to that of the
buyer in Moore v. Commissioner0 9 and Frithiof T. Christensen,'"
both of which held that a dividend paid to the seller was income to
the buyer. In those cases, however, the distribution was made after
the sale had occurred, and the seller held legal title to the stock only
as security for the unpaid purchase debt."' The fact pattern in those
106. 14 T.C. 1410 (1950).
107. Id. at 1417, quoted in Steel Improvement, 36 T.C. at 275.
108. Zenz does not specifically discuss taxation of the buyer, but Woodworth v. Com-
missioner, 218 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1955), indicates that the Zenz form does not cause him
to be taxed. 36 T.C. at 274. The difference in result (between Zenz as interpreted by
Woodworth on the one hand, and Steel Imnprovement on the other) cannot be justified
by the surrender of stock in Zenz. Whreas the buyer in Zenz, at the time of the dis-
tribution to the seller, actually owned his stock, the buyer in Steel Improvement had
only a lesser, beneficial ownership. If substance requires the inclusion of a distribution
to a seller in a buyer's income when that buyer has a beneficial ownership of the stock,
it should also require inclusion when the buyer actually owns his stock; yet the Sixth
Circuit rejected this very conclusion in Woodworth.
109. 124 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1941).
110. 33 T.C. 500 (1959).
111. The Sixth Circuit also found applicable Miller v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 206
(7th Cir. 1957), in which the dividend was declared while the purchase contract was
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cases thus is basically parallel to that of Wall. Steel Improvement's
is not, however, since the distribution did not actually satisfy any
indebtedness of the buyer, nor can it be so recast. For example, if
the prospective buyer of a corporation having $1,000 of equity ne-
gotiates only to acquire stock of a corporation having $600 of equity,
he cannot be considered to have acquired a $1,000 corporation. He
therefore cannot be considered to have incurred a $400 indebtedness
in order to buy the $1,000 corporation; and if he cannot, a $400 dis-
tribution to the seller, unlike the Wall situation, in no way satisfies
his debt.
In Steel Improvement, the Sixth Circuit found its conclusion
particularly appropriate under the facts of the present case, where-
in it clearly appears from the record of the negotiations that the
parties considered the $116,000 at issue to be part of the purchase
price. In those negotiations [the seller] said it must realize $900,000
.... The fact that [$116,000] was in the technical form of a divi-
dend does not alter the fact that it constituted a portion of the
$900,000 purchase price arrived at by negotiation.112
The buyer, however, appears to have been aware at all times that
acquisition of the corporation's undistributed income would cause it
a Canadian tax problem, and to have negotiated only on the basis
that the transaction occur in the form it did." 3 The seller, who ex-
pected a foreign tax credit, also negotiated on the basis that the dis-
tribution would be taxed to it as a dividend. Under those circum-
stances, Court Holding does not justify constructing an obligation of
the buyer which was satisfied by the distribution. On the contrary,
by permitting but not requiring a distribution to the seller, the parties
went out of their way to avoid having the distribution satisfy such
an obligation.
F. The Effect of Steel Improvement and Waterman
Casner v. Commissioneri1 4 shows how Steel Improvement and TVater-
man may continue to affect both reasoning and result. In that case
Casner, principal shareholder of a corporation which had been granted
executory. However, in Miller, the dividend was used to reduce the purchase price stated
in the contract; in that situation the principle of Court Holding, see p. 883 supra,
treats the buyer as if he had completed the purchase.
112. 314 F.2d at 98.
113. At a very early stage the buyer examined the corporation's financial statements
to determine its undistributed income, and the first concrete offer made by the buyer
required a distribution to the seller. See 36 T.C. at 267.
114. 450 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 28 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 535 (1969).
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a Chevrolet dealership, agreed at the urging of General Motors Cor-
poration to terminate his participation in the company.11 5 General
Motors required that shares in its distributorship companies be sold
at book value. In order to reduce book value so that the purchasers
could acquire Casner's shares at a smaller out-of-pocket cost while
satisfying Casner's insistence that he receive as much cash as possible,
the corporation declared and later distributed a pro rata dividend
to the corporation's six shareholders.
Contemporaneous with the declaration, Casner and another share-
holder, Slight, agreed to sell all their stock in the distributing com-
pany; two other shareholders used their distributions to buy part of
Casner's stock;."6 and the remaining two, whose holdings were small,
did not buy or sell. Neither buyers nor sellers reported any dis-
tribution as dividend income. Casner and Slight claimed that the
distributions to them represented part of the purchase price for their
shares; the buyers, on the other hand, argued that even distributions
to themselves were income of the sellers.
Agreeing with the Service's position, the Tax Court held that form
governed and that the distributions were taxable as dividends to the
respective recipients. With respect to the distributions received by the
sellers, Casner and Slight, it distinguished the Sixth Circuit's Steel
Improvement decision on three grounds: first, that four of the six
recipients did not sell any shares; second, that the Casner distributions
were not intended to be included as part of the purchase price;117 and
finally, that beneficial ownership remained with the original owners
at the time the dividends were declared, because minutes of the di-
rectors' meetings at which the declaration of the distribution was
made specifically stated that the sellers' transfers of stock would not
be effective until a few days later.
The distinction that most of the recipients were not selling shares
115. For ease of illustration, the distributions will be discussed as if made by a
single company, although they actually came from two corporations. Stock owned by the
same family group will be discussed as if owned directly by one individual.
116. Casner also gave some of his stock to one of the purchasers, his son-in-law; his
remaining stock, as well as Slight's, was sold to new shareholders. 450 F.2d at 382.
117. 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 541. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found as a fact-
contrary to the Tax Court's statement as to the intentions of the parties-that the sales
price for the stock "was fixed at book value including paid-in capital surplus." 450 F.2d
at 394. In fact, however, the minutes of the relevant board of directors meeting, as cited
by the Tax, Court, indicate that the agreed-on sales price was exclusive of the paid-in
capital surplus and that this surplus was to be distributed as the dividend at issue in
the case. 28 CCH Tax CL Mem. at 539.
In any event, the Fifth Circuit did not decide the case on the basis of its finding. Had
it done so, it would have been returning to the criterion of intent used by the Tax Court
in Waterman and Steel Improvement. See pp. 869, 885 supra.
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is persuasive, since it is difficult to conclude that some pro rata dis-
tributions made pursuant to a single dividend declaration should be
characterized as purchase price to shareholders selling their shares,
whereas others should not. The second and third grounds, however,
do not distinguish Steel Improvement, but rather are restatements of
the positions that the Sixth Circuit's Steel Improvement opinion spe-
cifically rejected. It was the Tax Court in Steel Improvement that used
the criterion of intention; a principal point of the Sixth Circuit's re-
versal was that its notions of economic substance prevailed over inten-
tion. In like manner, the Tax Court in Casner assumed that the sellers'
beneficial ownership continues until the stock is transferred. But the
buyer's rights before transfer are exactly what the Sixth Circuit in
Steel Improvement intended beneficial ownership to mean. Indeed,
it was to support such a meaning that the decision blurred the dis-
tinction between use of the term by Moore and Christensen (which
referred to the buyer's ownership of stock subject to the seller's se-
curity interest for the remaining unpaid purchase price)"" and its
own definition as the buyer's rights under an executory contract (where
the transfer had not yet occurred).
Misinterpreting Steel Improvement's definition of "beneficial own-
ership" thus allowed the Tax Court to decide Casner in accordance
with the Wall principle that only distributions which satisfy an ob-
ligation of the buyer are income to him. Similarly, disregarding Steel
Improvement's rejection of intent as a criterion allowed the Tax Court
to fit its decision within the Court Holding principle, since the buyer
never intended to buy a corporation which owned the distributed
profits. Although the principles of Wall and Court Holding should
have determined to whom the distribution in Casner was a dividend,
they do not serve to distinguish Steel Improvement, the reasoning of
which specifically rejects intent in favor of a purported substance.
With respect to distributions received by the buyers, it was argued
that they did not receive a dividend because of their obligation to
turn over the actual checks to the sellers. The Tax Court decided
that the buyers were taxable because they used their dividends to
purchase stock, adding that "[c]ertainly, they realized an economic
benefit."n 9
Reversing in part, the Fifth Circuit held that distributions to both
the sellers and the buyers were includable in the income of the buyers.
Quoting extensively from the appellate court opinions in Steel Im-
provement and Waterman and liberally citing cases involving tax
118. See p. 887 supra.
119. 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 542.
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avoidance, the court chided the Commissioner for his inconsistency
in seeking to give dividend treatment to the sellers in Casner but not
in Waterman:
Seemingly, this inconsistency between the Commissioner's posi-
tion in this case and his position in Waterman Steamship Cor-
poration evidences a tendency to rely on "substance" when bene-
ficial to the revenues or to rely on "form" when more beneficial
to the revenues. In any event, this approach cannot be accepted.
The economic substance of a transaction should generally be
decisive of its tax consequences to the taxpayer.12 0
The criticism is deserved. It should, however, have been made earlier,
when the Commissioner abandoned his correct Steel Improvement
position in litigating Waterman. The inconsistency which Casner
criticizes is just a return to the Government's view in Steel Improve-
ment, a return made in circumstances which indicate that benefit to
the revenues was not the primary motive. The Service probably drew
back from Waterman because of concern that its result (a distribution
to a seller treated as purchase price received by him) would, as in
Casner., cause an unexpected dividend consequence to the buyer'12
and a windfall to a seller other than a corporation.
The tax avoidance reasoning of Casner is even more difficult to
comprehend than that in Waterman. First, the desired tax result could
have been achieved through Zenz, and hence the court ignored the
principle that tax avoidance should not be found where another
form produces the same result. Second, and more important, in Casner
the decision that distributions to the sellers were includible in the
buyers' income resulted in a wholly unexpected tax to the latter. This
consequence would not have occurred in Steel Improvement, where
the buyer was a foreign corporation (which in any event was not be-
fore the court) and thus not subject to United States tax on the
Canadian distribution.
1 22
120. 450 F.2d at 398.
121. See p. 872 supra.
122. Recasting the form of a bootstrap acquisition is particularly objectionable whcre
it unexpectedly reallocates the tax burden. In Casner, the seller was apparently in a
high enough bracket that his tax would be significantly increased by the receipt of a
dividend rather than capital gain; yet he agreed to receive a dividend. If the purchase
price was adjusted to reflect that tax detriment, inclusion of the dividend in the buyer's
income produced a capital gain windfall to the seller. The issue was cogently expressed
(although from the perspective of the buyer rather than the seller) in Commissioner v.
Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967): an attack based on substance "would nullify
the reasonably predictable tax consequences of the agreement to the other party there-
to. . . . If unsuccessful, the buyer would lose a tax advantage it had paid the selling-
taxpayers to acquire."
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Finally, as might be expected, Casner spoke in terms not only of
tax avoidance, but also of economic benefit. The decision noted that
the cash distributions to the sellers reduced the book value of the stock
purchased, and concluded that "[c]ertainly, such reduction . . . rep-
resented a true economic benefit received by the buying stockholders,
[thereby resulting] in the constructive receipt of taxable dividends
by the buying stockholders."' 2 Yet shortly thereafter, the court re-
jected an argument that the distributions received directly by the
buyers were not taxable to them "because they received no economic
benefit from the cash distributions.' '12 4 In a succinct, logical statement
of what a dividend is-which it did not apply elsewhere in Casner
or in Waterman-the Fifth Circuit said:
[W]e conclude that the buying stockholders received the same
benefit from the cash distributions as would any other recipient
of a dividend distribution. To suggest that the proper test is
whether the shareholders are better off economically after the
cash distributions than before is incorrect since no dividend dis-
tribution enlarges the net worth of the shareholders. A dividend
merely transfers part of the value represented by the [sharehold-
er's] ownership interest in the corporation out of corporate solu-
tion and into his personal possession, reducing the value of his
corporate interest by the same amount received by him and thus
leaving his over-all net worth unchanged.
-'12
The Casner reasoning, then, had become so loose as to render the
language employed meaningless. To summarize the contradictions:
1. The Tax Court in Casner used the term beneficial ownership
to mean something different than what the Sixth Circuit meant by
its use of the term in Steel Improvement.
2. The Tax Court stated that the buyers "certainly" realized an
economic benefit from the distributions directly to them, whereas the
Fifth Circuit suggested that any such "benefit" was not economic.
3. In the most flagrant of the contradictions, the Fifth Circuit
stated that the distribution to the sellers was an "economic benefit"
to the buyers but indicated that the distribution directly to the buyers
was taxable to them even though not an "economic benefit" to them.
In other words, a distribution to I" economically benefits X, whereas
a distribution to X himself does not.
The potential for further inconsistency is obvious. As a consequence
of the Casner decision, the Tax Court has implied that the Zenz form
123. 450 F.2d at 399 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 400.
125. Id.
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might also result in a dividend to the buyer. 12  Oin the other hand,
tile Service, which has stated that it will not follow Casne;r,'2 7 held
in Revenue Ruling 75447128 that redemption of the seller's stock was
to be treated as a distribution to him; as such, it could not be a
dividend to the buyer.
The Service's opposition to Casner itself contains discrepancies. In
implicit response to the charge of inconsistency made by Casner,129
the ruling which reaffirmed the Service's position in that case-Rev-
enue Ruling 75-493-distinguished Waterman by stating:
Because the funds to pay the dividend [to Waterman] were ac-
tually furnished by the buyer, that amount was considered as part
of the purchase price paid by the buyer for the stock of the sub-
sidiary. Thus, the form of the transaction was a sham designied
to disguise the true substance of the transaction.' °
By contrast, when the buyer furnishes funds for distribution to the
seller in redemption of part of the seller's shares, the Service analyzes
the transaction differently. In Situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 75-447,
two individuals A and B owned all the stock of a corporation, caused
it to issue 25 new shares to a third individual C, and "as part of the
126. Royal Arrow Co., 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 241, 246 n.3 (1972).
127. Rev. Rul, 75-493, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 8.
128. 1975 INr. REV. BULL No. 42, at 9.
129. See p. 891 supra.
130. 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 8. As of this writing, however, the Service had
argued-in a case tentatively decided after issuance of Rev. Rul. 75-493-that the Water-
inan result obtained even where the buyer had not furnished funds with which to make
the distribution. In Basic, Inc. v. United States, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9126 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(trial judge's recommended opinion), the taxpayer-seller (Inc.) owned all the stock of
Falls Industries Incorporated (Falls), which in turn owned all the stock of Basic Carbon
Corporation (Carbon).
An unrelated corporation offered to purchase the businesses of Falls and Carbon. After
considering the tax consequences, Inc. agreed to sell only the stock of both Falls and
Carbon. In order to take advantage of Falls's basis in Carbon stock, Inc. caused Falls to
distribute its Carbon stock to Inc. just prior to the sale. A dividend of Carbon stock
from Falls to Inc. would not reduce Inc.'s tax basis in the stock of Falls. It would, how-
ever, gie Inc. a basis in the Carbon stock equal to the amount of Falls's basis in
Carbon. § 301(d)(2)(B). Thus, although the amount of the distribution (that is, the
amount of Falls's basis in Carbon) would be taxed to Inc. at the low rate applicable to
intercorporate dividends, that same amount would-by giving Inc. a basis in the stock of
its former second tier subsidiary-decrease income subject to the higher rate of capital
gains tax.
The trial judge held that Inc. "has not shown that there was a reason for the transfer
of the Carbon stock from Falls to [Inc.] aside from the tax consequences." 76-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff 9126, at 83,089. He therefore refused to recognize that a dividend had occurred for
tax purposes, stating that such treatment "is in keeping with the results reached in like
situations" (citing Waterman). Id. Under its position in Rev. Rul. 75-493, however-
which undoubtedly was issued after the arguments and briefs in Basic-the Service should
not have argued that Waterman requires the trial judge's result; the buyer in Basic did
not furnish the Carbon stock that was distributed.
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same plan" had the corporation redeem 50 shares of their stock. C,
the buyer, therefore furnished one-half the funds used to make the
redemption. Nevertheless, the ruling characterized the entire amount
received by A and B as "distributed" to them in redemption of their
stock. Thus, where the buyer furnishes funds to the corporation, the
Service's position is that "true substance"-and taxation of a dividend
to the buyer-rests on whether the distribution to the seller is ac-
companied by an economically meaningless surrender of stock.
A second discrepancy in the Service's position concerns the impor-
tance which it accords to timing when a distribution to a seller is
declared as a dividend but not when a distribution is made in re-
demption of stock. The Service's disagreement with Casner is illus-
trated by the holding of Revenue Ruling 75-493 that a cash dividend
formally declared and paid to the seller prior to his signing the sales
contract was taxable to him. The ruling emphasized that at the time
of declaration and payment the buyer "was under no legal obliga-
tion" to purchase the stock although-since the seller had offered to
cause the dividend "with the understanding that [the purchaser]
would then buy the [corporation's] stock"-the purchase agreement
signed the next day was clearly contemplated by both parties.' 31 With
respect to a redemption, however, Revenue Ruling 75-447 states that
where the distribution and purchase "are clearly part of an integrated
plan . .. , the sequence in which the events occur will be disre-
garded."' 32 Based on Zenz, this result is an administrative recognition
of the holding of that case as one of substance, which "requires that
effect be given only to the overall result and proscribes the fragment-
ing of the whole transaction into its component parts."' 3a Again, as
in the situation where a buyer furnishes funds, the Service's percep-
tion of substance rests on form, since the proscription against frag-
menting the transaction applies only when stock is surrendered.
131. 1975 INT. REv. BULL. No. 46, at 8. Somewhat inexplicably, the ruling mentions
that in Waterman the seller sold the stock "one hour" after the distribution, as though
the 23-hour difference mattered in determining whether the distribution should be in-
tegrated with the sale. A factor not mentioned, but which should be relevant in deciding
if two steps should be integrated, is whether the first step is reversible without sub-
stantial adverse consequences. In Rev. Rul. 75-493 the seller was stated to be an indi-
vidual, so that repayment of the dividend if the sale fell through would nevertheless
leave him with a tax by reason of the distribution. By contrast, in Waterman the
distribution would have been eliminated from income as an intercompany dividend in a
consolidated return year; and if the sale had not been effected, a contribution to capital
of the distributing company would put the parties in the same position as if the dis-
tribution had never occurred. Waterman's ability to undertake the first transaction with-
out tax or other cost means that, in assessing the independence of the two transactions,
less weight should be accorded the fact that the first one was effected before occurrence
of the second one bccame certain.
132. 1975 INT. Rv. BuLL. No. 42, at 9, 10.
133. Id.
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G. Towards Coherence
The above discussion suggests some conclusions about the econom-
ic substance of dividends as perceived by Waterman, Steel Improve-
ment, and the Service. First, despite the constant talk of substance
and the search for economic benefit, form can permit a seller to
achieve capital gain rather than a dividend (Zenz); and substance
should therefore not prevent a seller from achieving a dividend rather
than capital gain. Similarly, since form permits a buyer to eliminate
a dividend from income through the use of consolidated returns (Crom-
uell), substance should not prevent a seller from doing so.
Next, the Sixth Circuit's perception of substance in Steel Improve-
mnent does not contain any coherent concept of dividend. Its talk of
beneficial ownership, like talk of economic benefit, impedes seeing
a dividend for what it is-a removal of assets from corporate solution.
Determining the person whose assets are increased by such removal
rests on the substance of negotiation or-as permitted by Revenue
Ruling 69-608-contract.Y" As in Court Holding, the relevant nego-
tiations will be determined by taxes rather than economics-not how
much the seller will be paid, but in what form the transaction will
occur. To illustrate, assume that, as in our earlier example,135 a cor-
poration has an equity of $1,000 and $400 is distributed. The ques-
tion is whether the buyer has agreed to pay $1,000 for a corporation
worth 51,000 (in which event the $400 distribution should be con-
sidered as made to him), or $600 for a corporation worth 5600 (with
the $400 considered as distributed to the seller).
The Service's position in Steel Improvement-that whether a dis-
tribution to the seller constitutes a dividend or purchase price is de-
termined by the intent of the parties-does contain a coherent con-
cept of dividend. Moreover, the Service could have challenged the
taxpayer's dividend claim in TVaterman on a ground consonant with
both its Steel Improvement position and its rulings in the reorgani-
zation area. Whether amounts which in form are. distributed by a
transferred corporation prior to the sale or exchange of its stock in
substance constitute purchase price furnished by the buyer should
not depend upon whether the transaction is taxable. Section 368(a)
(1)(B) requires that consideration received from the acquiring cor-
poration in a stock-for-stock exchange consist "solely" of its voting
stock.1 3 6 To prevent avoidance of that requirement, the Service has
134. See note 105 supra.
135. Pp. 867, 887-88 supra.
136. If the exchangc does qualify as a reorganization within the meaning of § 368
(a)(l)(B), a transferor shareholder does not recognize gain or loss. § 354.
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taken the position that funds distributed by the transferred corpora-
tion to its shareholders in the form of a dividend prior to the ex-
change will, if replaced by the acquiring corporation, be considered
as consideration other than stock. That characterization, which treats
the transferred corporation as a conduit, means that the exchange will
not qualify as a reorganization. 13 7 Thus, the Service might have liti-
gated Waterman solely on the basis that, as in a reorganization, dis-
tributed funds arranged for by the buyer and replaced by him after
the acquisition should be treated as coming from him directly. Under
that reasoning, disregard of the temporary note leads to the conclusion
that the seller received cash from the buyer;las and disregard of both
notes leads to the conclusion of Judge Tannenwald's Tax Court
dissent that no dividend was distributed at all.1 39 But the Service did
not limit its argument to the ground that the buyer replaced the
funds. It also maintained that the "substance" of the transaction in
W'Vaterman was a payment of purchase price to the seller "irrespective
of the form of the transaction," relying on the Sixth Circuit's opinion
in Steel Improvement.'40 Not only is this approach inconsistent with
.,he Service's position that dividends distributed by the acquired com-
pany incident to a reorganization are not treated as purchase price
if not arranged for by the acquiring corporation; more fundamental,
it retreats to the view abandoned after Zenz, after Kobacker, and after
137. Conversely, property distributed by the transferred corporation, if not replaced
by the acquiring corporation, is not treated as purchase consideration. Rev. Ru. 70-172,
1970-1 C.B. 77 (distribution of property immediately before the reorganization exchange
not "part of the consideration given by [the acquiring corporation] in connection with
the exchange of stock"); Rev. Rul. 68-435, 1968-2 C.B. 155 (same); Rev. Rul. 69-443, 1969-2
C.B. 54 (distribution immediately after acquisition to shareholders who were of record
in transferred corporation immediately prior to closing). The Service failed to challenge
a purported reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B) in Arthur D. McDonald, 52 T.C. 82
(1969), where the acquiring corporation indirectly made funds available to the acquired
corporation, which then used the funds to redeem its preferred stock just prior to the
exchange. Because of the failure to challenge qualification of the exchange as a re-
organization, the Service has indicated its disagreement with the result in that case. Rev.
Rul. 75-360, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 37, at 11.
138. Disregard of only the temporary note to the seller means that the buyer, if he
purported to loan the distributed cash to the company in exchange for the note he re-
ceived, must be considered to have received the note as a dividend. See p. 872 supra.
139. The question of whether in substance the corporation had made a distribution
was not raised in Steel Improvement, although the seller received a cash dividend only
because the buyer made arrangements with a bank to loan the acquired corporation the
necessary funds. See 36 T.C. at 269.
140. 430 F.2d at 1191-92. Somewhat lamely, the Service stated that the diametiically
opposed Tax Court opinion in Steel Improvement was not in conflict with its position.
The Fifth Circuit's failure in Waterman to take into account the S2,799,820 diminution
in Pan-Atlantic's net worth-as a result of that company's distribution of a note for that
amount-makes unpersuasive its distinction of the facts of Steel Improvement as a case
in which the distribution was "concededly" a dividend. Id. at 1195.
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Cromwell-that taxation of distributions incident to an acquisition
is governed by a search for economic substance.
Prodded by the Casner court's criticism and a realization that
Casner could result in an unwarranted transfer of tax liability to
purchasers, the Service has moved in Revenue Ruling 75-493141 to
limit to two situations characterization of a dividend paid to the seller
as, in substance, purchase price: first, where the buyer furnishes the
distributed funds, as in Waterman; and second, where the dividend
is paid after the signing of the purchase contract, as in Steel Im-
provement.
The first limitation conforms the Service's position in taxable ac-
quisitions with that in reorganizations. Nevertheless, the Service's ex-
planation of Waterman on that basis, like Judge Tannenwald's dis-
sent, fails to discern that the note given by Pan-Atlantic to Waterman
rather than the cash supplied by McLean and Securities was intended
to be the dividend.142 The second limitation repudiates the rationale
of Waterman, which relied on Steel Improvement but does not re-
pudiate the rationale of Steel Improvement itself.143 Moreover, the
Service has concurrently expanded the scope of substance in redemp-
tions so that timing-that is, form-no longer even binds the taxpayer.144
But economic substance does not inhere in the niceties of contract
signing and certificate cancellations: those are poor economic standards
by which to determine for tax purposes whether a distribution inci-
dent to a bootstrap acquisition should be considered as independent
141. 1975 I\T. RlEv. BULL. No. 46, at 8. See pp. 893-94 supra.
142. The conclusion of Rev. Rul. 75-493, 1975 INT. Ruv. BuLL. No. 46, at 8, that
"fund5 to pay the dividend were actually furnished by the buyer" is at odds with its
assumption earlier in the same paragraph that "[o]ne subsidiary declared a dividend in
the form of a promissory note to Waterman" (emphasis added). When a buyer indirectly
furnishes funds to a seller by replacing those distributed by the corporation, the concept
of diiidend as a formal transfer most directly conflicts with the idea of a distribution as
resulting in a diminution of assets in corporate solution. The conflict is easiest to
iesohe in favor of a finding that there was no distribution for tax purposes-and that
the property came from the buyer-where the buyer replaces distributed cash by a
contribution to capital. By contrast, when as in Waterman a note is distributed and the
same or a similar note survises after the transaction as an obligation of the distributing
company, it becomes more difficult to sustain the conclusion of Judge Tannenvald's Tax
Court dissent that no distribution has occurred. That conclusion would be appropriate
if the note were considered equity under tax principles governing shareholder debt,
since the net corporate assets before and after the distribution would remain the same.
If the note were a debt for tax purposes, however, net assets would be removed from
corporate solution. Loaning the corporation funds to pay the debt does not replace them.
143. The Service may have reasoned that the criterion of a signed contract in Rev.
Rul. 75-493 was the same as that of Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43, discussed at p. 878
supra. But whereas the later ruling can be explained by Court Holding, Steel Improve-
tient cannot. Thus while the two rulings may seem to use similar standards, the case
law on which they rely is inconsistent.
144. Compare note 64 supra with pp. 893-94 supra.
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of or integrated with the sale on the basis of substance. If, as Revenue
Ruling 75-447 suggests, 145 a redemption distribution should be in-
tegrated with the sale, so that timing (and even the buyer's furnishing
of funds) is irrelevant, logic requires a similar integration for such
dividend distribution situations as Casner and Kobacker. Whether
the substance of that integrated transaction is a dividend to the seller,
as the Service claimed in Zenz; to the buyer, as the Service claimed in
Kobacker and Cromwell; or to no one, as the Service conceded
by following the result in all three cases, is no clearer now than it
was when Zenz was decided more than 20 years ago. If, however, the
/taxation of distributions incident to a sale is determined not with
regard to an alleged substance of dividend but rather with regard to
a negotiation substance appropriate to sales, it becomes possible to
apply a coherent dividend concept to Zenz, Steel Improvement, TWater-
man, and Casner: the recognition that form should control.
III. Transfers Between Commonly-Controlled Entities
In bootstrap acquisitions a corporation actually transfers property
in respect of its stock. As the discussion in Part II has shown, the
Service has frequently maintained that the characterization of this
transfer as a dividend distribution cannot be determined by looking
at its form alone: the circumstances surrounding the transfer must
be examined for its underlying substance and for tax avoidance
motives.
By contrast, when property is transferred without adequate con-
sideration from a corporation to its commonly-owned affiliate, Rev-
enue Ruling 73-605 states that the Service automatically will charac-
terize the event as a constructive dividend distribution to the common
owner from the transferring company followed by his constructive
contribution of the distributed property to the transferee:
An excessive payment made between controlled corporations re-
sults in a constructive dividend to the common owner followed
by a capital contribution from the common owner to the cor-
poration receiving the excess funds.146
The Service's exclusive focus on the fact that property has been
transferred from the solution of a particular corporation contrasts
145. See pp. 893-94 supra.
146. 1973-2 C.B. 109, citing Rev. Rul. 69-630, 1969-2 C.B. 112, and Sparks Nugget, Inc.,
29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 318 (1970), aff'd, 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 928 (1973). Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-528, 1973-2 C.B. 13 (involving a transfer of funds between
pension plans of the same employer).
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sharply with its search in bootstrap acquisitions for the substance of
such a transfer. It is therefore unfortunate but ironically fitting that
courts which the Service asks to look for the substance of bootstrap
acquisitions are equally willing to seek substance in the circumstances
surrounding an intercompany transfer. Nor is it surprising that such
substance is often expressed both in terms of tax avoidance and-
even in the ruling just quoted-in terms of economic benefit to the
common shareholder.147 Difficult as it was to find a consistent meaning
of "economic benefit" in the bootstrap acquisition cases, however, it
becomes even more difficult to determine what courts mean when,
in the context of intercompany transfers, they distinguish between
"direct" and "derivative" benefit to the common shareholder.
A. PPG: Dividends as a Function of Tax Avoidance
In PPG Industries, Inc.,1 4 s the common shareholder was a United
States corporation that owned all the stock of both a Brazilian hold-
ing company (Pittsburco) and a Swiss corporation (PPGI). Pittsburco,
in turn, owned a minority interest in a Brazilian operating company
(CVB) whose original cruzeiro tax cost to Pittsburco-computed for
United States tax purposes at the dollar value of the cruzeiro when
the investment was made-exceeded the stock's value in 1961, the
time of the transaction in question. Because of substantial deprecia-
tion of Brazilian currency against the dollar, however, Pittsburco's
Brazilian tax cost for its CVB shares-which was computed in cru-
zeiros-was less than its 1961 value in cruzeiros. Pittsburco therefore
would have had to pay substantial Brazilian tax on a sale of its CVB
shares for their fair market value, although in dollar terms it had
lost money on its investment. Moreover, any cruzeiros received by
Pittsburco upon such a sale would have been subject to Brazilian
exchange control restrictions.
After a decision by Pittsburco not to invest any more capital in
CVB, the Brazilian majority stockholders of CVB offered to purchase
Pittsburco's CVB shares outside Brazil. To mitigate the adverse Bra-
zilian tax and exchange control consequences of such a sale, Pittsburco
granted PPGI an option to purchase its CVB stock for 10% above
its original cruzeiro cost. On the same day, PPGI purchased the shares
and immediately resold them to the Brazilian group at a profit of
more than $477,000.
147. "A distribution by a corporation to a third party for the benefit of a share-
holder is a constructive dividend, which will be taxed as a dividend to the shareholder
for whose benefit the distribution is made." Rev. Rul. 73-605, 1973-2 C.B. 109.
148. 55 T.C. 928 (1970).
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The Service argued that the transaction amounted to a transfer of
$456,000149 from one subsidiary to another which resulted in a con-
structive dividend of that amount to the common shareholder.15° The
court rejected that argument, stating:
[W]e do not believe that the purported transfer of the net sales
proceeds in the amount of $477,398.37 from petitioner's Brazilian
subsidiary to its Swiss subsidiary for demonstrable business rea-
sons resulted in a constructive dividend taxable to petitioner.' 51
The court gave two principal reasons for that conclusion. First, it re-
ferred to its prior decision in Columbian Rope Co.,1 5 2 which held that
sales profits diverted from a Philippine to a Panama subsidiary in order
to avoid exchange control restrictions were not includable in the in-
come of the common shareholder, a United States corporation. Sec-
ond, the court found that since the transaction neither discharged
an obligation of the common shareholder nor was a "device for si-
phoning off corporate profits," it did not result in "any direct
benefit" to the common shareholder.
The Tax Court in Columbian Rope initially stated the issue for
decision as "whether [the Service] was correct in including the un-
distributed income of [the Panama company] in the taxable income
of petitioners."'153 The following passage from Columbian Rope, quot-
ed in PPG, also reads as though the Service contended in Columbian
Rope that the sales profit of the Panamanian subsidiary was the
amount that it proposed to include in the income of the United
States shareholder:
If [the Panama subsidiary] had not been formed and, instead,
all of the proceeds from the world sales of fiber were remitted
directly to the Philippine subsidiary, it is clear ... that its profits
would not be includable in petitioner's taxable income until
they were actually distributed to the petitioner. We do not see
how the presence of [the Panama subsidiary] calls for any dif-
149. There is an unexplained discrepancy between the $477,398 excess price that the
Service asserted was receivcd and the S455,959 constructive dividend determined by the
Service. Id. at 1000 n.11.
150. Alternatively, the Service contended that, under Court Holding, Pittsburco should
be considered to have made the ultimate sale and transferred $456,000 of the proceeds
to PPGI, or that Pittsburco transferred $456,000 of CVB stock to PPGI without con-
sideration. Under the first alternative the constructive dividend would have been in
cash; under the second, in kind. The court rejected both variants of this theory on the
same ground as it did the theory presented in the text, and the discussion therefore
applies to both theories. See id. at 1003.
151. Id. at 1002 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
152. 42 T.C. 800 (1964).
153. Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
Vol. 85: 861, 1976
The Deep Structure of Taxation
ferent result. Nothing is changed: the income is still generated by
the same fiber sales by the Philippine subsidiary on the world
market, except that now some of the income, instead of returning
to the Philippines, comes to rest in Panama.154
Constructive dividends, however, arise not from a diversion of in-
come, but from a diversion of property. Income is a characterization
which tax law attributes to certain transfers of property. In a con-
structive dividend case, the distribution which is constructed is that
of the property transferred, not of any tax characterization. The case
best illustrating the distinction is Helvering v. Horst,25 which has
been used to support findings of a constructive dividend on grounds
similar to that set forth in Columbian Rope.5 6 In Horst, a father
was held taxable on income arising from interest coupons which he
removed from a bond and gave to his son shortly before they became
payable. Clearly, the father had transferred property to his son; but
tax law characterized as the father's income the amounts collected by
the son when the coupons matured. Income, then, was the tax at-
tribute of the transferred property, not the property itself. An at-
tempt to divert a tax attribute from one company to its lower-taxed
affiliate, or from a father to his lower-taxed son, may require a con-
comitant transfer of property. For example, if corporation or father
X wants to show that affiliate or son Y is properly taxable on $20
of income, Y must receive the 520. But the same transfer of property
can occur simply by X giving $20 to Y without trying to allocate
income artificially. Such a transfer, in the corporate context, is a
dividend, because a dividend is the removal, not of tax attributes,
but of property from corporate solution. The distribution of property
from corporate solution may accompany, but does not consist of, the
attempted assignment of income from the person to whom tax law
attributes it.
The proper analogy to draw between an intercompany transfer and
Horst, therefore, is not the income tax result of Horst but the un-
contested gift tax consequences. Just as Mr. Horst would be con-
sidered to have made a transfer for gift tax purposes whether he
gave his son $20 of interest coupons or $20 of bond principal, an
intercompany transfer of property should be characterized as a con-
structive dividend regardless of whether the transferred property rep-
resents $20 of sales profits or 20 of contributed capital.
154. Id. at 812-13, quoted in 55 T.C. at 1002 (emphasis added).
155. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
156. See p. 908 and note 188 infra.
901
The Yale Law Journal
Had Columbian Rope recognized the distinction between diversion
of income and transfer of property, the sales profits transferred by
the Philippine company would have been treated as a dividend to
its parent even though the gain was not income to the parent.1 7 Thus,
although the fact pattern and result of Columbian Rope are sub-
stantially identical to those of PPG, its reasoning is inapposite to the
Service's PPG argument. The Service in PPG was not trying to tax
the shareholder on any purported imputed income to Pittsburco, but
rather on the $455,000 of sales proceeds constructively distributed by
Pittsburco.
With respect to its second reason-that the parent had not obtained
"any direct benefit" from the intercompany transfer-the PPG opinion
stated that "[a]ny benefit that could possibly accrue to petitioner,
as a parent corporation, would be purely derivative in nature,"'' 58
citing W.B. Rushing.159 Rushing concerned a transfer of money from
one corporation (LCB), owned by a Mr. Rushing, to another (Brier-
croft), also owned by him, which transfer the Service contended was
a constructive dividend. At the page cited in PPG, Rushing rejected
that contention, relying on the line of acquisition cases from Holsey
through Niederkrome and Priester6 0 to support its conclusion that
benefit to the shareholder was too "indirect."'-' However, in those
cases the distribution did not increase the noncorporate assets of the
shareholder the Service sought to tax. In Rushing, on the other hand,
the transfer increased the amount of Mr. Rushing's assets outside the
157. The Service's notice of tax deficiency in Columbian Rope did characterize the
diverted proceeds as "foreign dividend income." 42 T.C. at 809. Consistent with that
characterization, the Service argued that the Panama corporation should be treated as a
conduit, and that the court should "attribute the earnings which were temporarily passing
through [the Panama corporation] as actually having been received by the ultimate
beneficiary," the common shareholder. Id. at 813. Although that language confuses the
allocation of income with the distribution of property (in this case, money), it is an
argument that the diverted funds represent a dividend from the Philippine corporation.
But it is not the constructive dividend argument advanced in PPG-that the funds
should be considered as distributed first to the parent and then to the transferee sub-
sidiary.
158. 55 T.C. at 1002-03.
159. 52 T.C. 888, 894 (1969). The PPG court added a secondary reference to Commis-
sioner v. Offutt, 336 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1964), discussed at note 167 infra.
160. For a discussion of this line of cases, see pp. 877-78 supra. Although citing only
Priester, the Rushing court referred to a page in that opinion discussing Holsey and
Niederkrotne and stated that its reasoning was supported by a line of cases. 52 T.C.
at 894.
The court also relied upon the Service's acceptance of a line of cases finding no
dividend in a corporation's payment of premiums on a policy insuring the life of a
shareholder and intended to fund the redemption of his stock upon death. Id., citing
Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 C.B. 65. The reasoning of those cases does not figure prominently
in later constructive dividend cases and will not be discussed in this article.
161. 52 T.C. at 894.
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corporate solution of LCB, a fundamental distinction which the "bene-
fit" concept for which Rushing is cited conceals.
As viewed by Rushing and PPG, the proper distinction between
a direct and a derivative benefit to the common shareholder depends
upon whether it is motivated by tax avoidance (direct) or by a legiti-
mate business purpose (derivative). Rushing held that because LCB
owned a shopping center it had a "significant interest" in the busi-
ness of Briercroft, which by developing home sites on land adjacent
to the shopping center could be expected to provide customers. 162
Similarly, the court in PPG described the avoidance of Brazilian tax
and exchange controls as "demonstrable business reasons."'163 Con-
sistent with that standard, it stated that six cases' 64 cited by the Service
do not stand for the simplistic proposition, as respondent seems
to suggest, that any transfer of funds or property between sub-
sidiaries will give rise to a constructive dividend taxable to the
parent corporation simply because the subsidiaries are under a
common control. Instead, the cases that have found constructive
dividends have for the most part involved various devices for si-
phoning off corporate profits, sham corporations, or corporate
funds diverted for the direct benefit of the taxpayer-stockholder. 6 5
One of the six cases, Makransky v. Commissioner, indicates that
"funds diverted for the direct benefit" of a shareholder refers to the
Wall pattern." 6 The remaining five cases, however, involve "devices
for siphoning off corporate profits." In each instance the taxpayer
attempted to avoid United States tax by improperly attributing in-
come to someone other than the transferor corporation. But a con-
structive dividend is not the diversion of a tax attribute; it is the
transfer of property. Had those five cases focused on the transfer of
property out of corporate solution instead of on the diversion of United
States income, the PPG court would more likely have seen that the
fact patterns of the five cited cases are identical, for constructive divi-
162. Rushing has been categorized as a case in which "a proper corporate business
purpose prevented a common shareholder from receiving a constructive dividend."
Charles A. Sammons, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 626, 636 n.15 (1971), aff'd in part, 472 F.2d
499 (5th Cir. 1973).
163. 55 T.C. at 1002.
164. The six cases were Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713 (1st Cir. 1966);
Equitable Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 822 (1966); Makransky v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1963); Biltmore
Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 336 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 825 (1961);
Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953);
Helvering v. Gordon, 87 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1937).
165. 55 T.C. at 1003.
166. 321 F.2d 598, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1963). The Wall pattern involves payment by a
corporation of a shareholder's debt. See pp. 879-80 supra.
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dend purposes, to that of PPG. Although the corporation in each of
those five cases transferred funds in an attempt to divert United States
tax attributes, the parent corporation in PPG made the same type of
transfer in an attempt to divert a Brazilian tax attribute. It is illogical
to conclude that diversion of a Brazilian tax attribute is a demon-
strable business purpose, whereas an attempted diversion of a United
States tax attribute represents "siphoning."
Quite apart from the illogical application of a business purpose cri-
terion, there are three telling objections to applying a business purpose-
tax avoidance dichotomy at all:
1. If the transfer could be justified wholly by corporate business
considerations, the corporation would receive fair market value for
the transfer by obtaining, for example, utility service, 10 7 a steady
source of inventory, or potential customers. The question of a dividend
arises only to the extent that value is not so received. The issue which
must be resolved, therefore, is the business purpose for not receiving
any value.
2. In almost every case the same result could have been achieved
by transferring property in the manner constructed by the Service
(a dividend distribution followed by a capital contribution to the
commonly-owned corporation) as by transferring the funds directly
between the companies. Doing so, however, would result in a divi-
dend tax to the shareholders. Thus, regardless of why the funds are
removed from the transferor's corporate solution, the reason why they
are removed by lateral transfer rather than by distribution and con-
tribution to the other subsidiary is an attempt to avoid that tax.
167. The consideration obtained for the transfer explains the result in Commissioner
v. Offutt, 336 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1964), cited along with Rushing in PPG. See note 159
supra. In OffuLt, a land development corporation needed to ensure the availability of
adequate water and sewer services in order to obtain permits for the construction and
furnishing of houses, and-as a practical matter-to sell the houses. The land develop-
ment corporation offered to install the lines and facilities and to convey them to a
county or municipality in return for a covenant to supply water and sewer services to
purchasers of its houses. After the governmental authorities declined to accept the
transfer on such terms, the facilities were transferred on similar terms to a utility
corporation formed and wholly owned by Offutt, who also owned 40% of stock in the
development company.
The Commissioner contended that transfer of these facilities, which eventually were
sold for a substantial price, constituted a constructive dividend to Offutt. However, since
the land development corporation previously had attempted without success to transfer
the facilities to the county and municipality, and since, in addition, unrelated developers
also transferred water and sewer facilities to the utility company in return for a
covenant to operate them, the court quite properly concluded that in effect the land
development corporation had received adequate consideration for the transfer. The fact
that Offutt owned only 40% of the land development corporation provides an in-
dependent check: the other shareholders would not have let Offutt obtain a 100%
economic interest in a valuable asset of that company without receiving equivalent ialue
in return.
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3. A transfer between commonly-owned entities is not an economic
event. Its significance is the tax consequences. Accordingly, economic
considerations cannot distinguish between transfers which are solely of
tax significance. The attempt to decide what tax significance should
attach to an event which has no other significance creates disparities
between taxpayers whose actions in all relevant respects are identical.
For example, in Sammons v. United States,6" a common shareholder
was held to have received a constructive dividend for effecting a
bargain sale of stock to an affiliate in contemplation of resale to a
third party-exactly what was done in PPG. A dividend is a transfer
of property; it is not a moral judgment as to whether items of income
and deduction have been improperly allocated for United States tax
purposes.
B. Davis: The Supreme Court's Rejection
of Business Purpose
PPG was decided nine months after the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Davis, 69 to which the Tax Court did not refer.
Davis held that, in determining whether a redemption was "essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend" under § 302(b)(1), Congress apparently
had rejected court decisions "that had also considered factors indi-
cating the presence or absence of a tax-avoidance motive."' 70 It agreed
with the statement of the Second Circuit that under § 302(b)(1) "the
business purpose of a transaction is irrelevant in determining dividend
equivalence.""'7
Although the conclusion in Davis rests on congressional intent in
enacting a specific redemption statute,17- there is something profound-
ly unsatisfying about a tax structure in which business purpose and
tax avoidance determine whether a constructive dividend has oc-
curred but not whether an actual one has. Moreover, Davis comports
with the concept of dividend as a taxable rather than an economic
event, whose definition should therefore not depend upon purported
economic considerations. Nevertheless, the Service has not attempted
to extend the authority of Davis beyond the section which it con-
168. 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971).
169. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
170. Id. at 311 (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 312, quoting Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965).
172. The Government argued that even before enactment of § 302(b)(1) in 1954,
business purpose was irrelevant in testing the dividend equivalence of a redemption; but
the Court did not find it necessary to decide the question. 397 U.S. at 310.
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strued; and Sparks Nugget, Inc.,173 the chief authority on which the
Service relies to support its position in Revenue Ruling 73-605 as to
transfers between commonly controlled corporations,174 does not con-
sciously use a different criterion than cases that hold that business
purpose justifies an intercompany transfer. Accordingly, the Service's
disregard of business purpose in that ruling-a position this article
endorses-most emphatically does not reflect present law.
C. Present Law: Good Guys and Bad Guys
Since present law uses the criteria of business purpose and tax
avoidance, the principal differences among cases lie not in their fact
patterns but in their conclusions. For example, Sparks Nugget and
Sammons v. United States' 75 both held that transfers from one com-
monly-owned corporation to another were constructive dividends. In
Sparks Nugget, the common shareholder, Graves, argued that no tax
or other benefit accrued to him by reason of excessive rentals paid by
one of his wholly-owned corporations to others. Since all the corpora-
tions were in the highest tax bracket, he maintained that "any un-
justified transfer of funds had no greater effect than the transfer of
funds by an individual from one bank account to another."17", Dis-
agreeing, the Tax Court and Ninth Circuit held that Graves received
"substantial"' 77 or "immediate"' 7 benefits from the arrangement. In
finding these benefits, the Tax Court stated that "without such ex-
cessive rentals, it might have been necessary for Mr. Graves to make
capital contributions to such corporations out of his income on which
he paid taxes."'179
Since that statement describes almost every constructive dividend
case in this area, it would, if consistently used as a criterion of "di-
rect" benefit, reach the same result as the Service's position in Rev-
enue Ruling 73-605. However, when the Tax Court reaches a con-
clusion that there should be no constructive dividend, it phrases the
173. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 318 (1970), afj'd, 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 928 (1973).
174. See p. 898 supra.
175. 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971).
176. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 336.
177. Id.
178. 458 F.2d at 637.
179. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 337. The Ninth Circuit quoted a later paragraph in
the Tax Court's opinion as summarizing the nature of those benefits:
Had the rentals been set at a lower figure-at the amount which would have been
paid in the market place . . , it would have been necessary for [the transferee] to
have secured additional capital in some other manner, for example, by contributions
from Mr. Graves.
458 F.2d at 637.
Vol. 85: 861, 1976
The Deep Structure of Taxation
analysis somewhat differently. Thus, in Rapid Electric Co.,8 0 the
Service contended that extensions of credit from one corporation
(Rapid Puerto Rico) to its affiliate (Rapid New York) had become
equity advances taxable as a constructive dividend to the common
shareholder, Mr. Viola. However, rather than emphasizing-as Sparks
Nugget did-that this avoided the necessity for a declaration of a
dividend to the common shareholder, the court stated:
Whether we classify the extension of credit as debt or as some
other kind of investment, the working capital which was provided
to Rapid New York by Rapid Puerto Rico remained in the cor-
porate solution throughout the years in question. There is no
indication that any of it was siphoned off to or for the benefit
of Viola. Cf. Sparks Nugget, Inc. . ..1
These two cases, like most of the others, essentially involve the same
kind of transaction. Whether the court chooses to stress that a transfer
avoids the making of a distribution, or that the transfer serves a
business purpose, it is evident, first, that the "direct benefit" criterion
represents a conclusion, not an analysis, and second, that different
conclusions are being reached with respect to essentially identical
transactions. Because of those similarities in fact patterns, a court can
always find authority to support its conclusion. In Sparks Nugget,
for example, the Ninth Circuit stated that the arrangement devised by
the common shareholder was similar to one "recently condemned"'
8 2
by the Fifth Circuit in Sammons v. United States.'Sa It could just as
well have stated that the arrangement was similar to the one recently
approved by the Tax Court in PPG.
The word "condemned" is peculiarly appropriate. Since there is
no rational basis for distinction, a strong suspicion must arise that
courts are deciding constructive dividend cases on the basis of a moral
judgment as to whether the shareholder before them is the type of
fellow who generally avoids taxes. Thus, in Ross Glove Co.,18 4 Mr.
Ross was dealt with quite leniently. Since "[t]here may have been sub-
stantial business reasons"'' 8 for his foreign manufacturing company
to forbear from collecting advances made to his domestic sales cor-
poration, the advances, regardless of whether debt or equity, did not
constitute a dividend. The court noted that "Mr. Ross did not per-
180. 61 T.C. 232 (1973), acquiesced in result only, 1974-2 C.B. 4.
181. Id. at 240.
182. 458 F.2d at 638.
183. 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971).
184. 60 T.C. 569 (1973), acquiesced in result only, 1974-2 C.B. 4.
185. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
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sonally utilize the advances .... 1S6 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned in Sammons v. United States that the taxpayer received a
constructive dividend when
[i]n reality . . . , [he] took money from his five corporations and
placed it in a sixth. It is of little consequence that he personally
received no money from the transaction, for it is the power to
dispose of income and the exercise of that power that determines
whether taxable income has been received. Helvering v. Horst
187
The inappropriateness of citing Horst to support a constructive divi-
dend conclusion reflects the confusion in Columbian Rope between
property and tax attributes. 18 That confusion, not always accom-
panied by a citation to Horst, results in the failure by decisions such
as PPG, Columbian Rope, and Sammons v. United States to discrimi-
nate between tax avoidance at the corporate level, which arises only
when the corporation attempts to transfer tax attributes, and tax
avoidance at the shareholder level, which can occur by the transfer
of funds regardless of whether tax attributes are shifted. Courts there-
fore are more likely to find that a shareholder has engaged in tax
avoidance when the transfer of funds coincides with an attempt to
transfer corporate income for United States-but not, as in PPG, for
foreign-tax purposes.'8 0 Examples, in addition to Sammons v. United
States and the five cases described by PPG as involving "devices for
siphoning off corporate profits,"'190 are Ross Glove Co. and Robert
Trent Jones.191 Although Ross Glove approved explicit intercompany
186. Id.
187. 433 F.2d at 732.
188. See pp. 900-02 infra. Other cases citing Hor. t to support a finding of construc-
tile dividend include George AV. Knipe, 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 668 (1965), aff'd sub no1.
Equitable Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1966); Byers v. Com-
missioner, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952).
189. Even where an allocation of income is made, howeer, the court will not find a
constructive dividend when it is convinced of the taxpayer's good faith. For example, in
R.T. French Co., 60 T.C. 836 (1973), the taxpayer did not contest an allocation to it of
royalty income attributable to the free use by its foreign affiliates of patents, trademarks,
and other intangible assets. In rejecting the Ser ice's contention that the income so
allocated should have been considered constructively received by the taxpayer and paid
as a dividend to the common foreign parent corporation, the court stated:
The dividends actually declared and paid by petitioner in each of the )ears in
issue (SI,750,000 in each year) were so vastly in excess of the additional amounts that
the Commissioner would treat as dividends to petitioner's parent corporation
(S18,671.90 in 1963 and $19,566.18 in 1964) that we cannot believe that the free use
of petitioner's intangibles represented an attempt by the parent to direct further
benefits to itself.
Id. at 856 (emphasis added).
190. See note 164 and p. 903 supra.
191. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 488 (1975).
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advances, it reserved the question-not raised by the Service-of wheth-
er the Tax Court's reallocation of income to the domestic company
resulted in a constructive dividend to the common shareholder, Mr.
Ross.19 2 That reallocation had resulted from the court's finding that
the domestic corporation had paid too high a price for raw materials
purchased from its foreign affiliate; unlike the direct advance, the
excess price paid could not be justified as having any business pur-
pose. The domestic corporation, of course, received no consideration
for either the direct advance or the overcharges. Similarly, in Robert
Trent Jones, the taxpayer's Bahamas corporation (Planners), which de-
signed golf courses, was unable to collect its fee from his other Ba-
hamas corporation (Contractors) because of exchange controls. In hold-
ing that the failure to collect did not cause a constructive dividend,
the opinion stated:
We think it also important that the fee ($24,000) petitioner sought
to have Contractors pay Planners was standard in the industry.
Thus we find the instant case to be distinguishable from those
cases such as Sammons v. United States . . . ; Sparks Nugget,
Inc. v. Commissioner . . . ; Worcester v. Commissioner . . . ;
[and] Equitable Publishing Co. v. Commissioner . . . , involving
excessive payments for services or property by one related cor-
poration to another, where it can be said, unlike here, that the
stockholders of the recipient or transferee corporation received
a tangible benefit. 03
By focusing on the fairness of the uncollected fee rather than on the
transfer of funds, the court overlooked the fact that the transferor
was Planners, not Contractors; and Planners had no reason to pay
Contractors anything at all.
D. Two Loose Ends: Insolvent Transferees and
Diffeiences in Proportionate Ownership
Formulation of the dividend test with respect to intercompany trans-
fers sometimes differs from the phrasing used to test for dividends
incident to acquisitions. In the context of an acquisition, as in Sulli-
van,194 discharge of an obligation is equated with economic benefit;
by contrast, in the context of an intercompany transfer, it is recog-
nized as an alternative basis for dividend taxation. For example,
192. 60 T.C. at 596 n.5.
193. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 492.
194. Scu pp. 880-83 supra.
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the Tax Court stated in Ross Glove (and used a virtually identical
formulation in Rapid Electric Co.195):
It is well established that a corporate distribution can be treated
as a dividend if it is made for the personal benefit of a share-
holder or in discharge of a personal obligation of a shareholder. 96
The difference can be seen in Tirzah A. Cox, 97 which-citing W Vall
-held that funds transferred from one company (Commonwealth) to
its insolvent sister corporation (C 9. D) constituted a dividend only
to the extent that C & D used those funds to pay a note for which
Copple, a common shareholder, was personally liable as endorser. 9 s
An amount used by C & D to make a loan (which when repaid ap-
parently could have further reduced the note) 0 9 was not so taxed.
Cox is correct in its reliance on Wall to the extent that C & D
would be insolvent but for the transfer; to that extent, the funds
were transferred not to C & D but to satisfy a debt owed by Copple
to C & D's creditors. As in Wall, the satisfaction by Commonwealth
of a debt owed by Copple should be treated as a dividend to Copple.
But Cox does not go far enough, because it fails to consider the tax
consequence of transfers from Commonwealth to C & D after C & D
had become solvent.
To illustrate, assume that C & D had $80 of assets and $200 of
liabilities, all of which Copple had guaranteed. Assume further that
Commonwealth transferred $200 to C & D, all of which was used to
pay C & D's debts. Had Copple actually paid the creditors $200 and
been subrogated to their claims against C & D, he would have received
only $80 as a C & D creditor. Thus, although $120 of the $200
satisfies a liability of Copple's which C & D could not, and consti-
tutes a dividend from Commonwealth to Copple under the principle
of Wall, the remaining $80 is an amount which C & D can pay to its
creditors. The $80 should be treated as a constructive dividend because
it increases the amount of Copple's assets outside Commonwealth's
corporate solution. The reason for such increase, however, is not that
Commonwealth is satisfying any liability owed by Copple, but that
Commonwealth is raising the value of Copple's equity in C & D from
zero to $80.
195. 61 T.C. 232, 239 (1973).
196. 60 T.C. at 595 (emphasis added).
197. 56 T.C. 1270 (1971).
198. Id. at 1280.
199. As to the amount of the debt and repayments, see 56 T.C. at 1273-74.
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The analysis in Cox is therefore faulty in three respects: first, its
WVall rationale should apply only to the extent that C &: D would
otherwise be insolvent; second, transfers once C & D is solvent should
also constitute a dividend, not as a discharge of obligation under Wall
but as intercompany transfers; and third, the use to which C & D
puts the funds-immediate repayment of its debt or investment which
can be used to repay such debt in the future-should be irrelevant.
Where an intercompany transfer is not lateral, as in Cox, but from
a parent to an insolvent subsidiary, the tax characterization is ordi-
narily not a dividend but a contribution to the subsidiary's capital.
However, where, as in Charles A. Sammons,2 00 the shareholder of the
parent has guaranteed the debts of a subsidiary which thereafter be-
comes insolvent, Vall requires that the capital contribution to the
subsidiary be treated as a dividend to the parent's shareholder, but
only to the extent the subsidiary would otherwise be unable to pay
such debts. Sammons was therefore incorrect in holding, without re-
gard to the amount necessary to enable the subsidiary to become sol-
vent, that the transfer constituted a dividend to the extent used to
pay debts to, or guaranteed by, the parent's shareholder.
A separate issue, present but not discussed in Cox,2 0 1 arises when
the transferor and transferee corporations are not owned in the same
proportions. In both Cox and Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner2 02 the Service initially contended that the transfer constituted
a constructive dividend in proportion to shareholdings in the trans-
feree corporation; that contention was amended in both cases to refer
to shareholdings in the transferor, and the Third Circuit in Lupowitz
indicated that shareholdings in the transferee corporation were ir-
relevant.
2 03
But the shareholdings in both corporations are relevant. A share-
holder with, for -example, a 20% interest in the transferor but a
30% interest in the transferee can receive only $20 of a $100 transfer
with respect to his stock in the distributing corporation. The re-
200. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 626 (1971), af'd in part, 472 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1973).
The guarantor shareholder assumed the debts of the subsidiary. It appears that the
transferred funds-which were then used to pay the debt to the shareholder-did not
render the subsidiary solvent.
201. The court in Cox did not tax the minority shareholders on the transfer, perhaps
because the transfer was instigated by and within the control of Copple, the common
shareholder.
202. 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974), revg in part, aff'g in part, and remanding 31 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1169 (1972).
203. See 56 T.C. at 1277 n.4 (Cox); 497 F.2d at 868 n.14 (Lupowitz).
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maining $10 may be received as a gift20 4 or as compensation, or may
simply represent funds that he has appropriated from the other
shareholders. The $10 may therefore be income but not a dividend.
On the other hand, where a 30% shareholder in the transferor has
only a 20% interest in the transferee, he should be considered to
receive $30 as a dividend only if he is making a gift, paying com-
pensation, or otherwise attempting to transfer $10 to other people.
IV. Conclusion
This article has attempted to show that one tax concept can have
a logical and consistent meaning. The attempt, which challenges the
present perception of dividend distributions, rests on a larger as-
sumption that the meaning of basic tax concepts should not vary
from particular issue to issue.
The contrary view of judges like Friendly and Tannenwald-that
the meaning of a concept depends on its context in each particular
Code section-increases the uncertainty and complexity of tax law by
abandoning fixed points of reference. If two sections of the Code
intend different meanings, they can use different words; 2°5 and un-
intended results produced by consistent interpretation can be more
easily corrected than can the uncertainty and complexity arising from
an ad hoc judicial approach to meaning.
Also implicit in this article is a sense that the current call for
statutory simplicity is misdirected. Too often, such simplicity is ad-
vocated as a way of reducing the expense and effort involved in
understanding tax law. But readers who have followed the argument
this far will be aware that the Code did not create the difficulty
which the courts and Service have had in analyzing distributions, and
a shorter statute will not eliminate it. Tax simplicity inheres in con-
sistency, not in brevity of language, since questions of substance,
form, and tax avoidance will not disappear regardless of how little
detail the Code specifies. Rather, to the extent that the Code does
not supply detailed guidance to specific questions, the answers will
be determined by courts without the benefit of a clearly articulated
204. This possibility was overlooked in Walter K. Dean, 57 T.C. 32 (1971), which
mistakenly followed Commissioner v. Offutt, 336 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1964) (discussed at
note 167 supra) in a situation in which property was not transferred for adequate
consideration.
205. Alternatively, a term can be defined by statute for purposes only of a specific
provision. For example, control is defined as ownership of 50% of a corporation's stock
for purposes of § 269, but 80% for purposes of §§ 301-368 (except for § 304). See § 368(c).
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standard. Under such circumstances, improvement in either predict-
ability or ease of comprehension is doubtful.
The simplicity of a system should be gauged by the variety of re-
sults which a single concept can account for; its complexity, by the
need for exceptions. 20 1 By explaining more results and reducing ex-
ceptions, consistency in interpreting the same tax concept in different
contexts will represent a step towards simplicity. The idea of dividend
distributions proposed by this article offers a coherent explanation
of both the bootstrap acquisition cases and those involving transfers
between affiliates; and its coherence-the ability to treat the cases as
a rational whole-suggests the way to a simpler tax law.
206. The substance of tax rules could become substantially less complex by reducing
the exceptions to progressive taxation listed in § 57, generally referred to as tax prefer-
ences. Nevertheless, proponents of an easier-to-understand tax law seldom recommend
abolition of one of the provisions that causes the most difficulty-capital gains-and
generally concentrate their criticism on the complexity of the statute rather than on its
relief or preference provisions. To its credit, the Report on Complexity, supra note 3, at
333-51, criticizes both.
